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Abstract
This paper examines natives’ decision to grant political rights to foreign residents based
on their contribution to a redistribution mechanism that finances a private and a public
good. We propose a model where agents’ redistributive preferences are determined by their
skill level and their cultural beliefs about public spending, which vary by skill and nation-
ality. Contrary to a commonly held view in the political economy literature, we show that
low-skill natives are willing to enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as these for-
eigners have sufficiently liberal beliefs towards public spending. Moreover, we establish that
the political rights that low-skill natives are prepared to grant to foreign residents is a non-
monotonic function of immigration’s skill level and cultural support for public expenditure.
In particular, low-skill natives favor greater political integration for less-skilled or more lib-
eral foreigners if and only if these foreigners’ average relative preferences for the private and
the public good are sufficiently close to their own. We provide empirical support for some of
the theoretical predictions of the model using an original municipality-level dataset of Swiss
referenda about non-citizen voting rights. Our results indicate that municipalities where
a higher share of natives received social transfers were more likely to support immigrant
voting and that this effect was greater where foreigners were poorer and emigrated from less
economically conservative countries.
JEL Classification: H41, H53, J68, D72
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1. Introduction
Recent history suggests that immigration plays a crucial role in the politics of modern welfare
states. An important, yet commonly overlooked aspect of this matter regards the consequences
of foreigners’ political participation on redistribution policies. As foreigners gain the right to
vote in their host countries, they also have the potential of directly shaping the future tax and
transfer systems chosen by governments, which in turn face key political decisions about the
voting rights of non-citizen residents. Against this backdrop, a quick look at the data reveals
that a growing number of states have enfranchised foreign residents at the local level over the
past decades1 and that a handful of them grant foreigners the right to vote in national elections
under some residence requirements.2 National governments also implement naturalization poli-
cies which can vary significantly across states. For instance, the minimum number of years of
residence to become eligible for naturalization amongst OECD countries ranges from 3 years in
Canada to 15 in Lithuania. In a context of rising immigration, foreigners’ political participation
is therefore improving from a historical perspective, but remains an area of weakness for inte-
gration policy as immigrants still have few opportunities to inform and influence the political
decisions that affect them.
This paper hopes to inform the debates on immigration by looking at the consequences of foreign
political rights on redistribution and the economic motivations that fuel natives’ resistance to
the political integration of foreigners. Several works of political economy already provide a rich
insight into the relationship between natives’ fiscal concerns and immigrants’ political partici-
pation (See for instance Razin, 2002; Dolmas, 2004; Mayr, 2007; Ortega, 2010). However, this
literature suffers from two main caveats. First, they assume that the implications of foreigners’
political rights are limited to matters of income redistribution and therefore fail to account
for the fact that political choices may reflect individual preferences about both the size and
the composition of public spending. Indeed, public social spending and income redistribution
- individual cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with
social purposes - represent less than 40% of EU government expenditures on average, while a
more significant share of these expenditures finances public goods and services that benefit the
society as a whole, or large parts of society. In this paper, we choose to distinguish between
public spending on private and public goods to understand how the enfranchisement of foreign
residents can influence a country’s spending policy. A second major assumption of our theo-
retical analysis which is absent from those previous studies is that individuals’ redistributive
preferences are largely determined by cultural beliefs about public spending. The literature has
showed that economic welfare alone cannot explain individual preferences for redistribution and
that culture plays a very significant part in driving these preferences (Alesina and Angeletos,
1In spite of considerable variation in the content of these voting rights (Earnest, 2015), over 60 countries in the
world granted local voting rights to their non-citizen residents as of 2012. This figure includes the enfranchisement
of EU-citizens in EU member countries under the Treaty of Maastricht.
2These countries are Uruguay New-Zealand, Chile, and Malawi
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2005; Tirole and Benabou, 2006). In particular, immigrants’ views about public spending are
strongly affected by preferences in their country of birth, regardless of the economic context and
sometimes decades after individuals emigrated to their residence country (Luttmer, 2011). In
this context, we believe that a political economy approach to the concession of voting rights to
foreign-born residents should account for the redistributive implications of immigrants’ cultural
beliefs3.
In our model, we therefore account for both economic and cultural drivers of preferences for
redistribution and examine the incentives for domestic voters to support foreigners’ political
rights in an environment where the voting outcome reflects preferences for welfare transfers and
the provision of the public good. The paper contains two main results.
First, our theoretical model analyzes the consequences of foreigners’ political rights on income
redistribution and public good provision and how this affects natives’ attitudes towards en-
franchisement. We find that low-skill natives are more likely to grant political rights to foreign
residents when these foreigners are poorer and have greater cultural preferences for public spend-
ing. In particular, contrary to the commonly held view that low-skill natives would only support
the enfranchisement of foreigners if they are poorer than natives on average, we show that they
are willing to enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as these foreigners have sufficiently
liberal beliefs towards public spending. Moreover, we establish that the level of political in-
tegration that low-skill natives are prepared to grant to foreign residents is a non-monotonic
function of immigration’s skill level and cultural support for public expenditure. Rather, low-
skill natives prefer to grant fewer political rights to less-skilled or more liberal immigrants when
those immigrants’ relative redistributive preferences are too different from their own.
The second part of the paper tests the implications of the model using an original municipality-
level dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. We proxy the skill level of
natives and foreigners using the share of welfare-dependent individuals and predict foreigners’
cultural beliefs about public spending at the municipal level with the average preferences in
their country of origin. We show that, consistently with the model’s predictions, municipalities
where a greater share of natives received social transfers were more likely to support immigrant
voting, and that this effect was greater where foreigners were poorer and emigrated from less
economically conservative countries.
Our paper therefore contributes to the political economy literature by proposing a new the-
3More generally, cultural proximity between natives and foreigners is also a powerful enabler of integration.
In many countries, naturalization tests assess the desire to assimilate and the extent to which candidates to
naturalization respect and sometimes espouse the views and traditions of their country of residence. At the
European level, Portugal, the UK, and Spain have signed bilateral agreements with countries that they consider
culturally close to them and grant foreign residents from these countries the right to vote in local elections -
Brazil and Portugal, Spain and various Latin American countries, as well as England with several members of
the Commonwealth -. Such positive discrimination holds more generally across Europe under Article 22 of the
European Union, which grants exclusive local voting rights to citizens from fellow EU member countries.
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oretical framework and supporting empirical evidence to explore natives’ attitudes towards
foreigners’ enfranchisement. It should be stressed that our approach represents only one pos-
sible way to sketch conflicting political preferences between natives and foreign residents when
addressing the issue of foreign political participation. Also, we are aware that most immigrants
often self-select into naturalization or political integration, and that these policies can some-
times lead to sizable economic perturbations which affect immigrants’ productivity and skill
level. We leave those as well as non-economic considerations outside of the model. In spite of
these shortcomings, our paper is the first to propose a theory of enfranchisement which simul-
taneously builds on a two-dimensional, realistic approach of redistribution, and accounts for
cultural divergence in individual preferences for redistribution.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the theoretical po-
litical economy literature on redistribution pioneered by Metzler and Richard (1981). Recent
work in this field presents various models linking immigration and income redistribution. In
some of these models, redistribution is endogenously determined while immigration is taken as
exogenous. Immigrants then influence redistributive outcomes through economic channels such
as labour market competition or fiscal leakage, and by adding to the size of different interest
groups, changing the political constituency of the native population (See Razin et al., 2002;
Dolmas and Huffman 2004; Roemer and Van der Straeten, 2006). For example, the median
voter model developed by Dolmas and Huffman finds that admitting poor immigrants that can
vote does not necessarily imply higher redistribution and may lead to a lower tax rate if the
fiscal leakage effect dominates the political effect on the position of the median voter in the
income distribution. A more recent strand of this literature studies the effect of varying po-
litical institutions and citizenship rules in a setting where immigration is endogenous. Ortega
(2010) presents a dynamic model where voters choose the degree of income redistribution in
addition to immigration policy under three citizenship regimes, and find that income redistri-
bution can be sustained indefinitely under permanent migration and jus soli. Romero et al.
(2016) investigates the attitudes of natives with different skill level towards immigrants based
on their impact on wages, tax collection and the quality of the public good. They find that the
higher the political weight of the rich, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward
immigration and the more demanding toward increasing public spending. Closer to our work,
two papers analyze more specifically the economic drivers of naturalization policies and the
incentives for native citizens to grant political rights to foreigners. Mayr (2007) examines the
effect of immigration on income redistribution via majority voting where the skill composition
of immigrants is endogenous and depends negatively on the income tax. She finds that natives
are at best indifferent towards immigrant voting and may be opposed to it when the native
majority is not too strong. On the other hand, Mariani (2013) inquires about the timing of
naturalization policies for immigrants whose values and political preferences are different from
natives.
Our work is also related to the broader political economy literature studying enfranchisement.
The issue of franchise extension has received considerable attention, with theoretical contri-
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butions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and Oxoby
(2005), and Jack and Lagunoff (2006). An interesting empirical counterpart to these works
is Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010), in which the authors assemble a large, comprehensive cross-
country panel of citizenship laws and estimate the determinants of whether a country grants
citizenship based on bloodline (jus sanguinis), birth place (jus soli), or has a mixed regime.
Within this body of research, our paper is most related to the recent attempts to measure the
consequences of enfranchisement on redistribution and the size of the welfare state. In this
regard, recent work by Bertocchi (2011) finds that women’s suffrage increased the size of gov-
ernment over the 1870-1930 period in non-catholic countries. Abrams and Settle (1999) show
that women suffrage raised the overall size of the Swiss government, and that this occurred
through welfare spending but not government consumption. As our paper deals not only with
the size but also the composition of public spending, we should also mention the empirical work
of Funk and Gathmann (2005). They find larger differences regarding the scope rather than the
size of government at the cantonal level in Switzerland as a result of gender-specific preferences
for redistribution. To the best of our knowledge, few empirical papers investigate the causes
and consequences of franchise extension towards foreigners. One exception is Vernby (2013),
who shows that the effect of local enfranchisement of non-citizens on public spending policy was
large, causing spending on education and social and family services to increase substantially in
Swedish municipalities where foreigners made up a significant share of the electorate. Another
notable work by Stutzer and Slotwinski (2019) looks at power-sharing in the Swiss cantons of
Grisons and Zurich. They show that enfranchisement is less likely in municipalities with larger
shares of resident foreigners and a large language or cultural minority. We are also aware of a
recent unpublished manuscript by Koukal et al. (2019) which studies the willingness of natives
to enfranchise foreigners at the municipal level based on the same data on Swiss referenda as
we use in our paper. However, our focus is different since we are using this data to test specific
economic hypotheses based on a redistribution mechanism for which we provide theoretical in-
tuition.
Third, our paper is related to the empirical literature studying the role of immigration in pol-
itics. A first strand of this literature explores individual attitudes towards immigration based
on theories of labour market competition (Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Hain-
mueller and Hiscox, 2007) and fiscal leakage (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hanson et al., 2007).
It provides mixed evidence for both of these theories and suggests that the relative skill level
of immigrants does not necessarily plays out in the direction predicted by political economy
models. Another series of papers focus on the effect of the size and the skill level of immigration
flows on the political landscape of developed countries in terms of electoral behaviour (Otto
and Steinhardt (2014), Barone et al. (2016), Brunner and Kuhn (2018), Edo et al. (2017)).
While their findings varies according to specific national contexts, a recent paper by Moriconi
et al. (2019) generalizes voting responses to immigration at the European level and finds that
larger inflows of highly educated immigrants are associated with European citizens shifting their
votes toward parties that favor expansion of the welfare state while immigration of low skilled
individuals pushed political party agendas to reduce support for the welfare state.
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Finally, because culture plays a crucial role in our theoretical and empirical analysis, our paper
speaks to the literature on the impact of culture on redistribution (Verdier and Bisin (2000),
and Tirole and Benabou (2006). Our work also builds largely on the findings of Luttmer (2011),
who shows that immigrants’ preferences for redistribution are strongly affected by preferences
in their countries of birth, and in particular that immigrants from high-preference countries are
more likely to vote for more pro-redistribution parties.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 solves the model and
analyzes redistributive policy preferences with and without immigrant voting. Section 4 studies
natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’ political rights. Section 5 empirically tests the predictions
of the model, and section 6 concludes. Tables and proofs are located in the Appendix.
2. Model
We consider a closed economy with a native population whose size is N normalized to 1 and
an immigrant population with size M < 1.4 The native population has a share λnl of low-skill
workers and 1− λnl high-skill workers, whereas the share of low-skill workers in the immigrant
population is equal to λml . We assume that foreign-born residents and natives provide inelas-
tically one unit of labor supply to a measure 1 of firms that produce a good with the linear
production function Y = (λnl + Mλ
m
l )yl + (1 − λnl + M(1 − λml ))yh, with skill-specific wages
yl < yh.
5 In this economy, redistribution is financed via a proportional tax on wages at rate τ .
The tax proceeds G = τY are then used to finance a private transfer t to the exclusive benefit
of low-skill workers and a public good g in proportion µ (resp. 1−µ), such that the government
budget constraint writes τY = (λnl +Mλ
m
l )t+ g with
t =
µτY
λnl +Mλ
m
l
(1)
and
g = (1− µ)τY. (2)
We define the utility of an individual with skill i ∈ {l, h} and nationality j ∈ {n,m} as
ui,j = ln(ci) + α
j
i ln(g), (3)
4In what follows, we will refer to either immigrants or foreigners interchangeably.
5Our results would not be affected by assuming a non-linear production function and a labour market com-
petition effect on wages yl and yh. Indeed, as we shall see later in the paper, although income inequalities affect
the redistributive preferences of agents in our model, our main predictions do not depend on the level of wages,
neither in absolute nor in relative terms.
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where the benefits of redistribution vary across income class and nationality. Private consump-
tion writes cl = (1− τ)yl + t for low-skill workers, and ch = (1− τ)yh for high-skill ones. Only
low-skill agents receive the private transfer, which aggregates all cash expenditures paid out to
lower-income agents for welfare and social assistance purposes. On the other hand, αji ≥ 0 is an
income and nationality-specific taste parameter for the public good g, where αji = ψjαi. This
composite public good includes a variety of public expenditures including general public ser-
vices, environmental protection, defense and justice expenditures, and economic and financial
affairs which benefit all residents equally regardless of their skills and nationality. Moreover,
this public good covers public services to which skilled natives may prefer privately funded al-
ternatives, such as healthcare, education, housing and community amenities, leading to a lower
overall valuation of these goods for high-skill than low-skill workers (0 < αh < αl < 1). Also,
because individual preferences about the role of government in the provision of public goods
and services are to some extent the product of a national and cultural heritage beside economic
determinants, we make the assumption that the taste for the public good varies across nation-
ality through the parameter ψj , with 0 < ψj <
1
αl
6.
Political rights w ∈ [0, 1] are modeled as a continuous variable to capture the various degrees
through which foreigners are able to gain political influence. Although political participation
is often understood as the right to vote and exercise electoral rights, there exist several dis-
tinct ways to influence political decisions. We therefore propose a broader definition of political
rights which encompasses all political liberties and opportunities to participate in democratic
life7. Those include the presence of immigrant organisations and local consultative bodies, the
right to partake in political activism, lobbying, and protesting, the right to vote in local, re-
gional, or national elections, and the whole set of criteria that governs access to citizenship and
naturalization, which are both sufficient conditions for immigrants to participate in the political
process. Alternatively, the variable w can be interpreted as the share of foreign residents in a
country which are entitled to political rights based on their duration of residence.8
Finally, the redistributive policy σ = (τ, µ) determines the size and composition of public
spending in the economy. This policy σ is the outcome of a political process described by
probabilistic voting in its simplest form (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000), where all types of
agents, whether natives or foreigners, have the same ideological dispersion towards a candidate
and the relative political weight of foreigners is equal to w. The redistributive policy outcome
therefore maximizes the following social welfare function:
6The upper bound on ψj makes sure that public good consumption is valued less than or as much as private
consumption ( αji < 1 fo any (i, j) ∈ {l, h} × {n,m}). However, in practice, our results would hold if we were to
relax this assumption.
7Our approach mirrors the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), a set of over 160 policy indicators
describing migrants opportunities to participate in society in several countries
8Most countries impose residency requirements to foreign residents in order to be granted voting rights or file
for naturalization.
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W
(τ,µ)
= λnl ul,n + (1− λnl )uh,n + wM(λml ul,m + (1− λml )uh,m) (4)
subject to the budget constraint: τY = (λnl +Mλ
n
m)t(τ, µ) + g(τ, µ), with (τ, µ) ∈ [0, 1]2.
3. Redistribution
3.1 Preferences for redistribution
Before solving for the redistributive equilibrium with and without foreigners’ political rights,
we look at individual preferences over τ and µ. Let γ = yhyl be the income inequality ratio,
Ll = λ
n
l + Mλ
m
l and Lh = 1 + M − Ll the total low-skill (resp. high-skill) labour force in
the economy, and Fl =
ylLl
Y the share of output produced by low-skill workers. The policy
preferences σ∗i,j of an individual with skill level i ∈ {l, h} and nationality j ∈ {n,m} are then
characterized by the following first order conditions9:
FOCµi,j :
ti
µci
− α
j
i
1− µ = 0 (5)
FOCτi,j :
ti
τ − yi
ci
+
αji
τ
= 0 (6)
where tl = t and th = 0.
Turning first to the spending policy, notice that a greater µ is equivalent in our model to spend-
ing more on private transfers. As a result, the benefit from spending more tax proceeds on
private transfers is represented by the positive term tiµci while the benefit from spending more
on public good provision is captured by − α
j
i
1−µ , which is negative. Notice also that because high-
skill workers do not receive private transfers (th = 0), (5) becomes − α
j
h
1−µ and is always trivially
negative for high-skill agents regardless of the amount of income taxation in the economy. For
low-skill workers, on the other hand, the marginal benefit of increasing the share of tax proceeds
spent on private transfers is captured by the term tlµcl =
τyl
Flcl
= 1
µ+ 1−τ
τ
Fl
.
Moving now to the tax-rate policy, the first term on the LHS of (6) corresponds to the net
gains from income redistribution. For high-skill workers, this simplifies to − 11−τ and is always
negative because they do no benefit from any private transfers. For low-skill workers, the first
term on the LHS of (6) rewrites 1
τ+
Fl
µ−Fl
, and the net gains from income redistribution are posi-
tive provided µ > Fl, i.e when the spending policy redistributes a sufficiently high share of tax
proceeds in the form of private transfers. The second term on the LHS of (6),
αji
τ , is always
positive and captures the marginal benefit of increasing public good provision through a higher
9The strict quasi-concavity of u in both τ and µ is trivially satisfied.
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labour income tax for a given share µ spent on the financing of public goods.
As a result, the policy mix preferred by high-skill workers is trivial, so that µ∗h,j(τ) = 0 for any
τ ∈ [0, 1], and τ∗h,j(µ) =
αjh
1+αjh
for any µ ∈ [0, 1).10 Low-skill workers’ relative redistributive
preferences, on the other hand, depend on the relative value of τ and µ. More specifically,
when τ < 1, i.e under partial redistribution, low-skill workers’ preferred spending policy µ∗l,j(τ)
is an increasing function of τ because the provision of public goods depends entirely on gov-
ernment redistribution while individuals enjoy private good consumption in the form of labour
income. Therefore, when tax proceeds are smaller, a higher share of them must finance the pub-
lic good in order to ensure a minimal level of provision. Also, when the share of tax proceeds
financing private transfers µ is smaller than Fl
1+αjl
, low-skill workers prefer partial redistribution
(τ∗l,j(µ) < 1) and their preferred tax rate τ
∗
l,j(µ) is an increasing function of µ. First, recall from
the expression of (6) that when the share of government spending financing private transfers is
low enough, the net gains from income redistribution for low-skill workers are negative11, so that
increasing the tax-rate will decrease their private consumption. Thus, when µ is such that the
cost of a marginally higher τ on private consumption exceeds its marginal benefit from increas-
ing the provision of public good, low-skill workers prefer an interior solution τ∗l,j . Moreover, as
µ increases, the net marginal benefit from income redistribution increases as a greater share of
tax proceeds finances private transfers, while the marginal benefit from increasing public good
provision through a greater tax-rate remains constant12. Therefore, τ∗l,j(µ) increases with µ.
The former discussion is summarized in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1: For any (τ, µ) × (0, 1)2, τ∗h,j(µ) =
αjh
1+αjh
and µ∗h,j(τ) = 0. Moreover, µ
∗
l,j(τ) = 0 if
τ ≤ 11
α
j
l
Fl
+1
, and µ∗l,j(τ) > 0 and is increasing in τ otherwise. If µ ≥ Fl1+αjl , then τ
∗
l,j(µ) = 1,
and τ∗l,j(µ) < 1 and increases with µ otherwise.
We can also derive from FOCs (5) and (6) the bliss points of each type of agents in the economy.
In the absence of a distortionary effect of taxation, low-skill workers (resp. foreigners) prefer
that all labour income is redistributed and that government spending finances the public good
based on their relative taste for both goods, i.e such that the marginal benefit from consuming
public and private goods is identical under full redistribution (when τ = 1). On the other hand,
we already know from what precedes that high-skill workers prefer that redistribution finances
exclusively the public good and that labour income is taxed at a rate τ =
αjh
1+αjh
. Therefore, a
10Note that τ∗h,j is in fact discontinuous at µ = 1, where τ
∗
h,j(1) = 0 <
α
j
h
1+α
j
h
because skilled individuals want
no redistribution at all when the tax proceeds finance exclusively private transfers. In the rest of the paper, we
will however focus our attention on interior solutions for τ and µ.
11Observe that 1
τ+
Fl
µ−Fl
< 0 whenever µ < Fl, which is indeed satisfied if µ <
Fl
1+α
j
l
12 α
j
i
τ
does not depend on µ
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low-skill worker will always prefer a strictly higher tax rate τ and a weakly greater spending
policy µ than a high-skill worker of the same nationality: τ∗l,j = 1 > τ
∗
h,j and µ
∗
l,j ≥ µ∗h,j = 0.
Lemma 2: The preferred policy pair σ∗i,j = (τ
∗
i,j , µ
∗
i,j) of an agent of skill i ∈ {l, h} and
nationality j ∈ {n,m} is:

(τ∗l,n, µ
∗
l,n) = (1,
1
1+ψnαl
)
(τ∗h,n, µ
∗
h,n) = (
ψnαh
1+ψnαh
, 0)
(τ∗l,m, µ
∗
l,m) = (1,
1
1+ψmαl
)
(τ∗h,m, µ
∗
h,m) = (
ψmαh
1+ψmαh
, 0)
Individual policy preferences are corner solutions and are not affected by the size or the skill
composition of the native and foreign populations. Figure 1 below graphs the preferred policy
pair σ∗l,j and σ
∗
h,j and indifference curves IC
j
l and IC
j
h in the policy space (τ, µ). The utility-
improving set of low-skill and high-skill workers is respectively located to the north-east and
the south-west of ICjl and IC
j
h, and the grey areas capture the parameter space over which the
indifference curve of high-skill workers, low-skill workers or both has a positive slope. Because
rich workers’ preferred tax-rate is always equal to
αjh
1+αjh
and they do not want redistribution to
finance private transfers, they will prefer to trade a lower tax-rate against a spending policy that
finances a lower share of public good (a greater µ) as long as τ is greater than
αjh
1+αjh
. As a result,
their indifference curve is upward sloping if τ ≤ α
j
h
1+αjh
, and downward sloping otherwise. For
low-skill workers, the grey zone on the right hand side of Fig. 1. corresponds to the parameter
space where (i) the spending policy µ is such that the net gains from income redistribution are
positive (analytically, both terms on the LHS of (6) are positive) and (ii) the marginal benefit
of spending more tax proceeds on public good provision is greater than the marginal benefit
of spending more on private transfers (the LHS of (5) is negative). For any policy pair (τ, µ)
located in this space, there is under-provision of public goods and low-skill workers prefer a
greater income-tax and that a greater share of tax proceeds finances the public good. On the
contrary, when the net marginal cost of labour taxation on private consumption outweighs the
marginal benefit from increasing public good provision through a greater tax-rate (analytically,
this is the case when the LHS of (6) is negative), low-skill workers benefit from a reduction in the
income tax and a greater share of tax proceeds financing private transfers. This is represented
by the grey zone in the upper left corner of Fig. 1. Finally, the white zone in the middle
corresponds to the parameter space where the policy pair (τ, µ) is such that low-skill workers’
utility increases with τ and µ.
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Figure 1: Indifference curves and MRS in the (τ, µ) space
µ
τ
0
σ∗l,j
σ∗h,j
1
1
MRSl = 0
MRSh = +∞
ICjl
ICjh
MRSl = +∞
We now turn to the preferences of workers based on their nationality j ∈ {n,m}. Analyzing the
redistributive policy preferred by natives and immigrants separately provides a more intuitive
grasp of the underlying mechanisms driving natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement. To
do this, we first describe in the next section the redistributive political equilibrium when only
natives have the right to vote.
3.2 Redistributive equilibrium without foreign voting
In this section, we characterize natives’ preferences by looking at the electoral outcome when
foreigners have economic rights but are excluded from the franchise (w = 0). The political
equilibrium defined in Section 2 then maximizes a weighted social welfare function where the
weight of each skill group of natives is equal to their share of the population. Let σn = (τn, µn)
be the policy pair solution to
max
σ
W = λnl ul,n(σ) + (1− λnl )uh,n(σ)
Solving the first order conditions for policy preferences τn and µn yields
13:
σn =

(
αn
1+αn
, 0
)
if λnl ≤ Fl(
1− 1−λnl(1+αn)(1−Fl(λnl ,λml )) ,
1
1+αn
1−Fl(λnl ,λ
m
l
)
λn
l
−Fl(λnl ,λ
m
l
)
)
otherwise
(7)
13The strict quasi-concavity of Wn in both τn and µn is trivially satisfied
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where αn = ψn
[
λnl αl + (1− λnl )αh
]
is the average taste for the public good among natives.
First, notice that under our simple probabilistic voting framework, the political weight of the
low-skill group corresponds to the share of low-skill workers in the native population λnl . Second,
observe that the marginal benefit of a policy that spends more on private transfers will decrease
when the share of output produced by low-skill workers Fl increases. The intuition is straight-
forward: Fl =
ylLl
Y is an increasing function of γ (i.e is decreasing with income inequalities)
and the share of low-skill workers Ll in the economy. Therefore, in line with seminal models of
redistribution such as Meltzer and Richards (1981), the marginal value of income redistribution
is decreasing with the average wealth in the economy, which is captured here by Fl. A direct
consequence of this effect is that low-skill natives have less to gain from increasing the share
of public money spent on private transfers when Fl increases. In our model, this implies that
income redistribution, i.e spending more tax proceeds on private transfers, becomes relatively
less efficient and less valuable than spending those tax proceeds on the provision of public goods.
Furthermore, because only low-skill natives receive the private transfers, the marginal value of
income redistribution is always nill for high-skill natives. As a result, the social value of income
redistribution, or the value of income redistribution for society as a whole, decreases with Fl.
When the political weight of low-skill natives is too small with respect to Fl, the social value of
income redistribution becomes negative, and µn = 0.
Graphically, when λnl ≤ Fl, the redistributive equilibrium σn spends no money on private trans-
fers (µn = 0). In Figure 2.a, it is located between the points σ
∗
h,n and σ
0
n on the contract curve
that runs from low-skill to high-skill natives’ policy preferences (the thick dark line). When
λnl = Fl, a marginal increase and a marginal decrease in µ have the same social value, and the
redistributive outcome is located at σ0n. When λ
n
l ≥ Fl, it becomes socially optimal to spend
some of the tax proceeds on private transfers, and µn > 0.
Moreover, observe that the electoral outcome σn is Pareto-optimal
14 (MRSl,n= MRSh,n) and
that the marginal rate of substitution of natives is positive at σn: The equilibrium tax-rate and
share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers is too low (resp. too high) for low-skill (resp.
high-skill) natives. Because we make the assumption that immigration is already present in the
country, the size and average wealth in the economy is fixed, and redistribution therefore boils
down to a zero-sum game between low-skill and high-skill natives. It is worth stressing that
symmetric results would hold for the redistributive preferences of foreigners σm = (τm, µm) if
the redistributive equilibrium was decided by a voting process in which only foreigners were
allowed to vote. In this regard, symmetric propositions to 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 derived hereafter
apply to the preferences of foreigners.
14This is a standard result of probabilistic voting (Coughlin (1982)
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Figure 2: The consequences of immigration on natives’ redistributive preferences
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Proposition 1.1: When λnl ≤ Fl, τn is increasing with ψn, αl and αh. When λnl > Fl, τn is
increasing with αl and αh, and ψn, and µn is decreasing in ψn, αl and αh.
A greater intrinsic taste for the public good (captured through ψn, αl and αh) decreases the
share of tax proceeds financing the private transfer as natives’ relative taste for the public good
over the private good increases. Likewise, the equilibrium tax rate τn increases with ψn, αl, and
αh since natives then value the consumption of the public good more independently of their
support for income redistribution. Graphically, an increase in ψn shifts σ
∗
l,n to the left while
σ∗h,n and σ
0
n move up. As a result, the new policy equilibrium shifts up and left with the new
contract curve (see Fig 2.b).
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Proposition 1.2: When λnl ≤ Fl, τn is increasing with λnl . When λnl > Fl, µn and τn are
increasing with λnl .
We first describe what happens when λnl > Fl. The impact of an increase in the share of
low-skill natives λnl on the equilibrium policy µn goes through three distinct channels. The first
one is political: When the low-skill group has greater political weight, this pushes the spending
policy µn up as low-skill natives prefer that a greater share of tax proceeds finances private
transfers than high-skill natives (this is captured by the term λnl − Fl in the expression of µn
in (7)). The second and third channels are economic: A greater share of low-skill workers λnl
implies that the economy is poorer on average, and therefore that the social marginal value of
income taxation is lower, along the same intuition as the one developed in the previous section.
Therefore, µn goes down as it becomes socially optimal to spend a lower share of public funds
on private transfers. Also, because low-skill natives value the public good more than high-skill
natives (recall αl > αh), the average taste for the public good among natives will increase with
λnl : As a result, the social value of the public good increases, and µn decreases. The aggregate
impact of λnl on µn is positive because the political effect dominates the economic effect: The
additional political weight of low-skill native λnl outweighs the change in natives’ average eco-
nomic preferences.
In the same fashion, the impact of λnl on τn depends on the relative changes in the political
weight of low-skill natives with respect to the economic preferences of the native population:
When the political weight of low-skill natives λnl increases, the tax rate policy τn increases
as well because low-skill natives prefer a higher tax-rate than high-skill natives (recall that
τ∗l,n(µn) > τn > τ
∗
h,n(µn)). A greater share of low-skill workers λ
n
l also implies that the economy
is poorer on average, and therefore that the marginal social value of income taxation is lower,
which exerts a downward pressure on τn. Finally, because αl > αh, the average value of public
good for natives goes up with λnl . This increases their demand for the provision of public good
regardless of how much they value income taxation and increases τn. The effect of the two pos-
itive channels combined always dominates the adverse impact of a lower social value of income
taxation, and τn increases with λ
n
l .
When λnl ≤ Fl, the impact of λnl on the equilibrium tax-rate τn only depends on the changes in
the political weight of low-skill natives and natives’ average taste for the public good. Indeed,
redistribution does not finance the private transfer (µn = 0) and therefore λ
n
l has no effect on
the social value of income redistribution. Since both of the former channels have a positive effect
on the equilibrium tax-rate, we have that τn unambiguously increases with λ
n
l when λ
n
l ≤ Fl.
Graphically, when λnl increases, σ
0
n moves up and defines a new contract curve (see Fig 2.c).
When λnl ≤ Fl, σn simply moves up along with this new contract curve. When λnl > Fl, the
policy equilibrium σn moves in the north-west direction and shifts up and right alongside the
new contract curve.
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Proposition 1.3: γ has no effect on σn as long as λ
n
l ≤ Fl. When λnl > Fl, τn and µn
increase with γ.
Income inequalities only affect σn through the average income in the economy and therefore
the social value of income redistribution. Therefore, as long as λnl ≤ Fl and redistribution
does not finance private transfers, a change in income inequalities will have no effect on the
redistributive equilibrium. On the other hand, when λnl > Fl and µn > 0, both τn and µn
will increase with income inequalities γ. The intuition is the following: Ceteris paribus, greater
income inequalities will increase the size of cash transfers received by low-skill natives. Because
high-skill natives’ preferences over µ and τ are completely independent (recall µ∗h,n(τ) = 0 and
τ∗h,n(µ) =
αnh
1+αnh
), a higher γ will only affect low-skill natives’ redistributive preferences. As a
result, the marginal social value of greater income taxation increases, and τn and µn increase
as well, bringing the redistributive equilibrium closer to low-skill natives preferences.
Graphically, when γ increases, σ0n goes down and σn will move up on the contract curve towards
σ∗l,n and reach a redistributive equilibrium that features a greater tax-rate and a spending policy
that spends a greater share of tax proceeds on private transfers.
Proposition 1.4: When λnl ≤ Fl, a change in the the size (M) or the skill composition (λml )
of immigration does not alter the redistributive outcome. When λnl > Fl, µn and τn decrease
with λml . Moreover, µn and τn decrease with M if and only if immigrants are less skilled than
natives on average.
When the spending policy does not finance private transfers, the change in immigrants’ skill
composition or in the size of immigration has no effect on σn. In fact, a larger and / or a less
skilled immigration does not affect natives’ preferences for the public good but only the average
income in the economy and therefore the social value of income redistribution. As discussed
previously, when redistribution does not finance private transfers, this has no effect on the redis-
tributive equilibrium. However, when λnl > Fl, a relatively less skilled immigration implies that
the economy is poorer on average, which reduces the social value of income redistribution, and
τn and µn therefore decrease. In the same fashion, if immigrants are less skilled than natives on
average (λnl < λ
m
l ), the economy becomes poorer as more immigrants enter the country, which
has the same adverse impact on the social value of income redistribution as an increase in λml .
This leads to lower τn and µn in equilibrium. Graphically, an increase in λ
m
l or an increase in
M when λnl < λ
m
l will have the same consequences: σn will shift down and left alongside the
contract curve.
This last proposition resonates with the recent findings of the political economy literature.
More specifically, a large body of works documenting the impact of immigration on welfare
attitudes finds that natives reduce their support for income redistribution in the presence of a
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relatively low-skill immigration (see for instance Alesina et al. (2005, 2018)), and this welfare
retrenchment is often associated in the theoretical literature with two distinct channels. The
first one is cultural: Natives selectively oppose redistribution towards immigrants whom they
perceive as undeserving, which is also referred to as welfare chauvinism. The second channel
is economic, and suggests that natives decrease their support for redistribution when faced
with low-skill immigration as they expect transfers to decrease with the average income in the
economy. Proposition 1.4 above falls into the second category, as we find that both the tax-
rate and the share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers are decreasing (resp. increasing)
with the size of immigration when immigrants are on average less (resp. more) skilled than
natives.
3.3 Redistributive equilibrium with foreign voting
We now turn to the impact of foreigners’ enfranchisement on the redistributive equilibrium. We
first provide a graphical example of the consequences of foreigners’ enfranchisement in the policy
space (τ, µ). In Figure 3, the locus of all possible redistributive equilibria when foreigners are
granted political rights is represented by the shaded area in blue, where the outer limit of that
space extends towards the contract curve of foreigners as the size of immigration M increases.
More specifically, for a given set of preferences σn and σm, the policy equilibrium when foreigners
do not have political rights coincides with the preferences of natives σn and moves towards σf
- the policy outcome when foreigners are granted full enfranchisement (w = 1) - along the
blue segment as foreigners’ political rights increase. The slope of this segment is equal to the
marginal rate of transformation between τ and µ with political rights, i.e the relative rate of
change between the two policy variables with w. In the rest of the paper, we normalize natives’
cultural taste for redistribution to ψn = 1 so that ψm = ψ capture immigrants’ relative cultural
preferences for public spending.
Figure 3: The consequences of foreigners’ political rights on redistribution
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Let σ0(w) = (τ0(w)µ0(w)) be the redistributive policy equilibrium when foreigners have political
rights w ∈ [0, 1]. Maximizing (4) over σ then yields the following equilibrium policies15:
µ0(w) =
1
1 +
αp(w)(1−Fl)
λnl −Fl+Mw(λml −Fl)
(8)
τ0(w) = 1− 1− λ
n
l +Mw(1− λml )
(1 + αp(w) + wM)(1− Fl) (9)
where αp(w) = αn + wMαm captures the socially weighted taste for the public good in the
economy when foreigners have political rights w.
Proposition 2.1: The tax rate τ0 increases with the political rights of foreigners w if and only
if 1+αn1+αm ≤
1−λnl
1−λml . The share of government spending financing private transfers µ0 increases
with w if and only if αmαn ≤
λml −Fl
λnl −Fl .
This proposition states the condition under which the enfranchisement of foreign workers will
lead to an increase in the equilibrium tax rate τ0. Intuitively, τ0 will increase with the enfran-
chisement of foreign workers when the average preferred tax rate among foreigners is greater
than the average tax rate preferred by natives. It is also clear from what precedes that the
equilibrium tax rate τ0 is increasing with the share of low-skill workers in the economy and
the cultural taste for the provision of public good α. In relative terms, this implies that the
preferred tax rate of the average immigrant worker τm will be greater than natives’ preferred
tax rate τn when (i) the relative share of low-skill workers in the foreign population and (ii) the
relative taste of foreigners for the public good are sufficiently high, as stated by the inequality
in the first part of the proposition.
Moreover, the impact of migrants’ enfranchisement on the composition of public spending de-
pends on the relative preference for private transfers over the public good between natives and
foreigners. While a relatively greater share of low-skill foreign workers increases the demand for
private transfers and thus increases µ0, relatively stronger preferences for the public good exerts
a symmetric downward pressure on the spending policy as the average worker in the franchise
values the public good more. Note that both channels depend positively on λml , and therefore
µ0 increases with w when foreigners’ cultural preferences for the public good ψ are sufficiently
low.
Figure 4. graphs the effect of the political rights of foreigners on redistributive policies in the
space (λml , ψ). The red shaded area corresponds to the parameter space over which τ0 is in-
15For the rest of the paper, we will focus our attention on interior solutions only, namely on solutions where
(τ0, µ0) ∈ (0, 1)2 and therefore assume that λnl +Mwλml > Fl(1+Mw). This assumption does not alter the main
predictions of the model and simplifies the exposition
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creasing with w, while the grey, hatched area indicates the values of ψ and λml for which the
share of public spending on transfers µ0 is increasing.
Proposition 2.2: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), the share of tax
proceeds spent on cash transfers µ0 increases with political rights w if foreigners are on average
less skilled than natives (λml > λ
n
l ). Moreover, when ψ ≤ 1, if the equilibrium tax rate τ0 is
increasing with w then µ0 is increasing as well:
dτ0
dw ≥ 0 ⇒ dµ0dw ≥ 0. When foreigners are more
liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), the equilibrium tax-rate policy τ0 increases with political rights w
if foreigners are on average less skilled than natives (λml > λ
n
l ). Moreover, if µ0 is increasing
with w, then τ0 is increasing as well:
dµ0
dw ≥ 0 ⇒ dτ0dw ≥ 0.
When foreigners have lower cultural preferences for the public good than natives, they prefer
that the government spends more money on the provision of private transfers than natives,
ceteris paribus. Also, we know from Proposition 1.2 that a greater share of low-skill workers of
nationality j increases the share of public money spent on private transfers µj preferred by indi-
viduals of nationality j. Therefore, when foreigners are both less skilled than natives and have
intrinsically lower preferences for the public good (ψ < 1), their enfranchisement will always
lead to a weakly greater share of tax proceeds spent on the financing of private transfers µ0.
Also, because a lower taste for the public good decreases the tax-rate τj preferred by workers
of nationality j, a necessary condition for the tax rate τ0 to increase with w is that immigrants
are less-skilled than natives.
A symmetric argument can be made for the case where foreigners value the public good more
than natives (ψ > 1). It suffices then that foreigners are relatively less skilled than natives
(λml > λ
n
l ) in order for the tax-rate policy τ0 to increase with political rights w. Likewise,
because foreigners’ that have greater taste for the public good than native prefer to spend fewer
tax proceeds on private transfer, ceteris paribus, a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
equilibrium policy µ0 to increase with w is that foreigners are relatively less skilled than natives.
Foreigners’ political rights can therefore influence redistribution in the four possible ways de-
picted in Figure 4: When the skill level of immigration is high enough ( λml < Gµ and ψ < 1
or λml < Gτ and ψ > 1), the enfranchisement of foreigners decreases both the tax-rate and the
share of tax proceeds spent on private transfers (area (1)). When foreigners have sufficiently
greater taste for the public good ( λml < Gµ and λ
m
l > Gτ ), granting foreigners political rights
lead to an increase in the size of public spending (a greater τ0) and a decrease in the share of
pubic spending spent on private transfers µ0 (area (2)). When the immigrants are sufficiently
unskilled and the preferences of foreigners for the public good low enough, both the tax rate and
the share of tax proceeds spent on transfers increases when foreigners are enfranchised (area
(3)). Finally, when the skill gap between immigrants and natives is small enough and foreigners
value the public good less than natives, their political participation leads to a greater share of
public spending financing private transfers µ0 and a lower tax rate τ0 (area (4)). The thick
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black line represents natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement and will be discussed later in
the paper.
Figure 4: The consequences of foreigners’ political rights on redistribution
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Finally, because natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement depend ultimately on the impact
of political rights on the level of private consumption and public good provision through their
redistributive implications, we characterize the effect of foreigners’ political participation on c
and g. Plugging (8) and (9) into the expression of ci and g, we obtain the following level of
private consumption and public good provision at the redistributive equilibrium σ0:
ci(σ0) =
Y (λni + λ
m
i Mw)
(λni + λ
m
i M)(1 + wM + αp)
(10)
g(σ0) =
αpY
1 + wM + αp
(11)
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Proposition 2.3: The private consumption ci of natives with skill level i ∈ {l, h} increases
with the political rights of foreigners w if and only if λmi (1 + αn) ≥ λni (1 + αm). The level of
public good provision g increases with the political rights of foreigners w if and only if αm ≥ αn.
For low-skill natives, the net effect of political rights on private consumption is positive when
private transfers increase with w. Because only low-skill workers receive private transfers, the
political participation of foreigners leads to an increase in the size of these transfers only when
the share of low-skill immigrants λml is sufficiently high. Moreover, the impact of political rights
on redistributive policies depends not only on the skill composition of foreigners but also on
their relative cultural preferences towards public spending. In particular, foreigners choose to
increase the amount of tax proceeds and spend a greater share of those proceeds on public
good provision as ψ increases. Therefore, another condition for low-skill private consumption
and private transfers to increase with w is that foreigners’ cultural preferences towards public
spending are sufficiently low16.
The level of public good provision g will increase with political rights when the average taste for
the public good among foreigners is greater than among natives. Recall that αj = ψj
[
λjlαl +
(1−λjl )αh
]
, from which comes immediately that the effect of w on the provision of public goods
depends on the relative skill composition and the cultural preferences of foreigner. Therefore,
public good provision will increase following foreigners’ enfranchisement when αm ≥ αn, i.e
when immigrants are sufficiently unskilled and their cultural preferences for redistribution are
sufficiently high.
4. Attitudes towards political rights
We have seen in the previous section how the political rights of foreigners alter the redistributive
political equilibrium σ and thereby impact natives’ private and public good consumption. We
can now determine under which conditions the enfranchisement of foreigners benefits natives.
Plugging (10) and (11) into (3) gives the following indirect utility function for low and high-skill
natives:
Vl(w) = ln
( Y (λnl + λml Mw)
(λnl + λ
m
l M)(1 + wM + αp)
)
+ αl ln
( αpY
1 + wM + αp
)
(12)
Vh(w) = ln
( Y (1− λnl + (1− λml )Mw)
(1− λnl + (1− λml )M)(1 + wM + αp)
)
+ αh ln
( αpY
1 + wM + αp
)
(13)
Lemma 3: Low and high-skill natives have single-peaked preferences in w.
The preferred level of political rights w∗i of a native with skill level i ∈ {l, h} is then obtained
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by maximizing Vi over w. The FOC then yields the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Natives have opposite views towards the political rights of foreigners: wl > 0
⇔ wh = 0.
The intuition is simple. In the absence of political rights, because the redistributive policy
outcome σn is Pareto-optimal, the marginal rate of substitution is the same for low-skill and
high-skill natives and there exists no policy deviation from σn that can improve the utility of
both groups. Therefore, natives hold conflicting, income-specific views over w. Fig 5 represents
graphically the locus of political redistributive equilibria σ0 for different values of σm and ψ.
Natives will prefer to grant some political rights (w∗i > 0) to foreigners when the redistributive
political equilibrium moves from σn into their utility-improving set. When ψ > 1 (Fig 5.a), a
first possibility is that foreigners’ preferences are located at σ1m, such that τ0 and µ0 decrease
with w (outcome (1) of Fig. 4). The redistributive equilibrium is then located on the blue seg-
ment between σn and σ
1
m and in the utility-improving set of high-skill natives and stays outside
that of the low-skill group. On the other hand, both σ2m and σ
3
m represents a set of foreign
preferences for which foreigners’ political rights would benefit low-skill natives at the margin
(i.e at w = 0), respectively through an increase in τ0 and a decrease in µ0 (σ
2
m, outcome (2))
and an increase in both τ0 and µ0 (σ
3
m, outcome (3)). Fig 5.b represents all possible political
outcomes when ψ < 1. The case where foreigners’ preferences are located at σ1m and σ
3
m have
been discussed previously. σ4m (outcome (4)) corresponds to the fourth possible way in which
foreigners’ political rights may impact the redistributive equilibrium: The tax-rate τ0 decreases
while the spending policy µ increases. The graphical example presented here is such that the
enfranchisement of foreigners benefit high-skill natives, but we will see later in the paper that
this is not always the case.
Figure 5: Natives’ attitudes towards enfranchisement
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Proposition 4: Skill i natives grant political rights w∗i > 0 to foreigners if and only if λ
m
i ≥ λi,
with λi > 0. Moreover,
dλl
dλnl
≥ 0 and dλldψ ≤ 0, and
dλh
dλnh
≥ 0 and dλhdψ ≥ 0. Finally, λl ≥ λnl and
λh ≤ λnh if and only if ψ ≤ 1.
The first part of Proposition 4 is rather intuitive and simply states that natives prefer to grant
foreigners political rights w∗i > 0 when immigrants with the same skill level as their own make
up a sufficiently high share of the foreign population. For low-skill natives, the redistributive
policy outcome σn is such that the tax-rate and the share of public money spent on private
transfers is too low. Therefore, they would never grant political rights to foreigners when too
many of them are skilled, as their enfranchisement would then lead to lower values of both τ0
and µ0 (see Prop 2.1). Furthermore, because low and high-skill natives have symmetric views
towards enfranchisement, high-skill natives will always grant foreigners political rights when
low-skill natives refuse to do so, and therefore support foreigners’ enfranchisement when immi-
grants are sufficiently skilled. However, the relatively unskilled or skilled immigration alone
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the enfranchisement of foreigners because
redistributive preferences are also driven by cultural beliefs ψ. Proposition 4 therefore predicts
that the maximum (resp. minimum) skill level for which low-skill (resp. high-skill) natives are
willing to grant foreigners political rights increases with the share of low-skill (resp. high-skill)
foreigners and immigrants’ cultural preferences for redistribution: When foreigners are more
liberal towards public spending (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives are then willing to enfranchise them
even if their average skill level is greater than natives’, i.e even if λml < λ
n
l . On the other hand,
they will hold more restrictive views towards the enfranchisement of conservative immigrants,
and would only grant them political rights under the condition that they are strictly less skilled
than the native population. High-skill natives, on the contrary, have symmetric attitudes to-
wards immigrants’ political rights, and would enfranchise foreigners more easily when those are
less supportive of government spending. This is represented in Fig. 4 by the thick black line,
which divides the parameter space between the values of λml and ψ for which natives prefer to
grant political rights to foreigners.
To better understand the interaction between the skill level of immigrants and their cultural
preferences behind this last result, we discuss hereafter the impact of foreigners’ political rights
on private consumption and public good provision for low-skill natives. The following discussion
should give the reader sufficient intuition to achieve a symmetric conclusion for high-skill natives.
First, notice that low-skill natives will always oppose enfranchisement when cl and g decrease
with w and always support it when they both increase with w. On the other hand, a trade-off
between private and public good consumption arises when either cl or g increases and the other
decreases with w. More specifically, when foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ < 1),
this trade-off is such that private consumption increases and public good provision decreases
with w (see Prop 2.3), and low-skill natives then enfranchise foreigners (w∗l > 0) if and only if
the following inequality is satisfied:
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λml (1 + αn)− λnl (1 + αm)
αn − αm ≥
αlλ
n
l
αn
(14)
The term on the LHS of (14) corresponds to the relative marginal impact (or marginal rate of
transformation) of political rights on private consumption and public good provision, i.e the
ratio of the marginal effect of w on cl over its marginal impact on g at the redistributive policy
equilibrium σn
17, i.e when foreigners are excluded from the franchise. On the other hand, the
term on the RHS captures natives’ marginal rate of substitution between c and g at σn. The
ratio αlαn measures the relative value of a marginal increase in g while λ
n
l corresponds to the
marginal value of private consumption. Because utility is concave in both c and g, the relative
value of an increase in g decreases with low-skill natives’ average taste for the public good
αn and the relative value of private consumption cl decreases with the political weight of skill
low-skill natives λnl . This is because the larger these parameters are, the greater the value of g
and cl will be at σn.
When cl increases and g decreases with w, foreigners’ political participation increases low-skill
natives’ utility through higher private transfers and decreases it through lower public good pro-
vision. Low-skill natives then enfranchise foreigners when the relative marginal impact of w on
cl is sufficiently high with respect to their marginal effect on g
18.
Also, while the share of low-skill immigrants λml does not affect natives’ marginal rate of sub-
stitution between cl and g at σn (the RHS of (14)), it increases the marginal impact of political
rights on cl and decreases their marginal impact on g
19, which implies that the relative marginal
impact of w on cl with respect to g (the LHS of (14)) is increasing with λ
m
l . In particular, when
immigration is less skilled (λml is higher), the marginal impact of political rights on cl increases
with w by (1 + αn) − λnl ψ(αl − αh), where the first term (1 + αn) is positive and captures
the effect of the additional weight of low-skill voters supporting private transfers, while the
second term −λnl ψ(αl − αh) represents the adverse impact on private consumption of foregone
tax proceeds not financing private transfers as a result of a greater taste for the public good
among foreigners: Recall that low-skill workers value the public good more than skilled work-
ers: αl > αh, and therefore a less skilled immigration also has a greater average taste for the
public good. Incidentally, the skill composition λml has a direct effect on the marginal impact
of political rights on g, which decreases by ψ(αl − αh), as foreigners’ average preferences for
the public good increase. Therefore, the fact that low-skill workers value the public good more
than skilled workers lowers the positive marginal impact of w on private consumption cl but
also decreases the adverse marginal impact of w on g when the share of low-skill immigrants
17The numerator is positive because cl increases with w while the denominator is positive as g decreases with
w. See Prop 2.3.
18Analytically, this is the case when the marginal impact of political rights is greater than the marginal rate
of substitution
19The derivative of λml (1 + αn)− λnl (1 + αm) with respect to λml is (1 + αn)− λnl ψ(αl − αh), which is always
positive when ψ < 1, and the derivative of αn − αm with λml is −ψ(αl − αh) and always negative
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goes up.
Besides, it is easy to check that the share of low-skill immigrants λml has a relatively greater
effect through foreigners’ cultural preferences ψ on the marginal impact of political rights on g
than it has on the marginal impact of political rights cl, since ψ(αl−αh) > λnl ψ(αl−αh). When
cl increases and g decreases, this implies that the relative marginal impact of w will increase
more rapidly with λml for larger values of ψ. In other words, as λ
m
l increases, political rights
become relatively more efficient at increasing private consumption than they are at decreasing
public good provision when ψ is higher, and low-skill natives will support enfranchisement for
lower values of λml .
When ψ > 1, low-skill natives face the opposite trade-off, where private consumption decreases
and public good provision increases with w. They enfranchise foreigners if and only if the
following inequality is satisfied :
λml (1 + αn)− λnl (1 + αm)
αn − αm ≤
αlλ
n
l
αn
(15)
Using a symmetric argument as before, a greater ψ then implies that as λml increases, political
rights will be more efficient at increasing public good provision than they are at decreasing
private consumption so that the maximum skill level for which low-skill natives are willing to
grant foreigners political rights increases with ψ.
A more general economic intuition for the previous discussion is that greater cultural taste for
redistribution and a greater share of low-skill immigrants work as complements in low-skill na-
tives’ decision to enfranchise foreigners: For a given skill level of immigration λml , a greater ψ
leads, ceteris paribus, to greater tax proceeds, which can be used to finance more public good
and / or greater private transfers. On the other hand, a lower ψ leads to lower tax proceeds
and forces a trade-off between the financing of private and public goods. When ψ > 1, the fact
that foreigners have greater cultural taste for redistribution therefore creates a form of redis-
tributive slack by increasing the amount of tax proceeds so that low-skill natives may choose to
enfranchise immigrants even if those are relatively more skilled than natives on average. On the
other hand, when ψ < 1, more conservative views towards redistribution shrinks the amount of
tax proceeds which requires that immigrants are strictly less skilled than natives for low-skill
natives to benefit from their enfranchisement.
Therefore, in our model, the skill composition of immigrants alone does not explain natives’
attitudes towards foreigners’ political participation. Rather, natives will support the enfran-
chisement of foreigners based on the combined effect of the quality of immigration and the
cultural preferences of foreigners on redistribution. In this regard, Proposition 4 establishes a
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simple but original result20. It predicts that when foreigners are relatively liberal towards public
spending, low-skill natives grant political rights to richer immigrants when the aggregate effect
of enfranchisement on their level of public and private consumption increases their economic
welfare. Symmetrically, when foreigners are relatively conservative, high-skill natives enfran-
chise poorer immigrants when their enfranchisement decreases the size of government spending
so that the utility gains from a lower tax-rate are greater than the cost of decreasing the pro-
vision of public goods. This result is represented graphically in Figure 4 by the thick dark line
which parts the parameter space according to the preferences of low-skill and high-skill natives.
In what follows, we characterize the willingness of natives to grant political rights by looking
at how their preferred level of political rights w∗ varies with the exogenous parameters of the
model when the optimization problem of natives admits an interior solution.
Proposition 5: Both low and high-skill natives’ preferred level of political rights decreases with
the size of immigration M .
In line with recent studies about natives’ attitudes toward foreigners’ political participation
(Mariani, 2013, Stutzer et al. (2019), our model predicts that a larger immigration reduces
natives’ support for political rights. In our model, the size of immigration influences natives’
preferred level of political rights only through the political weight of foreigners. Recall that
because immigration is not endogenous, redistribution is a zero-sum game. Natives therefore
only support the political rights of foreigners insofar as they contribute to bringing the pol-
icy outcome as close as possible to their own preferences. In this regard, the level of political
participation w and the size of immigration M can be regarded as perfect substitutes because
foreigners’ political weight following enfranchisement is simply the product of the size of immi-
gration and their political rights Mw. Since a larger immigration implies that the impact of
foreigners’ enfranchisement on redistribution will be greater for a given level of political rights
w, less political rights are required to influence the equilibrium policy in natives’ most preferred
way when M is larger, and w∗ therefore decreases with M .
20As mentioned in the introduction, these results do not depend on income levels and inequalities and would
therefore hold under the assumption of labour market competition between natives and immigrants.
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Proposition 6: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill natives’
preferred level of political rights w∗l increases with foreigners’ cultural preferences for redistri-
bution ψ. Moreover, w∗h increases with ψ for sufficiently low values of αm, and decreases with
ψ otherwise. When foreigners are more liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives preferred
level of political rights w∗l increases with foreigners’ cultural preferences for redistribution ψ for
sufficiently low values of αm, and decreases with ψ otherwise. Moreover, w
∗
h always decreases
with ψ.
First, notice that if both private consumption ci and public good provision g increase with w,
then natives will always grant foreigners full enfranchisement (w∗i = 1). On the contrary, when
both private consumption and public good provision are decreasing with political rights, natives
always oppose enfranchisement and w∗i = 0. Therefore, for any interior solution w
∗ ∈ (0, 1) to
the optimization problem of natives, it must be that either c or g increases while the other
decreases with w, and we will thus focus our attention on these two scenarios in what follows.
Second, notice that an increase in ψ implies that (i) foreigners are in favour of taxing labour
income more because a greater taste for the public good, ceteris paribus, requires higher tax
proceeds, and (ii) foreigners’ valuation of the public good αm w.r.t to private transfers increases.
In what follows, we describe the intuition behind Proposition 6 separately for low-skill natives
and high-skill natives.
When w∗l ∈ (0, 1) and foreigners are relatively conservative (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill natives’ private
consumption cl increases while public good provision g decreases with w (τ0 is decreasing and
µ0 increasing with w). Therefore, a higher ψ implies that a marginal increase in political rights
leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, i.e is such that the tax rate τ0 decreases less with w.
Second, as foreigners’ cultural views on public spending ψ improve, the spending policy µ0
puts relatively more weight on the financing of public good provision and these additional tax
proceeds are spent in a way that is better aligned with low-skill natives’ relative taste for the
public and the private good21. Therefore, by increasing the size of tax proceeds and shaping
the use of public funds in a more profitable way, a larger ψ increases the marginal benefit of
political rights for low-skill natives, and w∗l increases with ψ.
When w∗l is interior and foreigners are relatively liberal (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives’ private con-
sumption cl decreases while public good provision g increases with w (τ0 is increasing and µ0
decreasing with w). As before, a higher ψ is such that a marginal increase in political rights in-
creases tax proceeds relatively more (τ0 increases more with w), which benefits low-skill natives.
However, the effect of ψ on the spending policy now depends on foreigners’ relative taste for the
public good αm. As long as αm is lower than αl, the same positive effect as before plays out:
Changes to the spending policy benefit low-skill natives because foreigners’ relative preferences
21αm increases with ψ. Therefore, when
dg
dw
< 0 and αm < αn, the gap between low-skill natives’ relative taste
for the public good αl and foreigners’ αm gets smaller as ψ increases, since we have trivially that αl > αn > αm.
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between both goods gets closer to their own as ψ increases22. Therefore, w∗l increases with ψ.
On the other hand, when ψ increases and foreigners’ valuation of the public good αm is greater
than αl, a marginal increase in w will redistribute tax proceeds according to a spending policy
that is now further away from natives’ relative preferences. An increase in ψ is then profitable
for low-skill natives as long as its former positive tax-rate effect dominates its adverse impact
on the spending policy. This is the case when foreigners’ average taste for the public good αm
is sufficiently close to that of low-skill natives αl. However, when αm is too high, the spending
policy channel dominates and w∗l decreases with ψ.
For high-skill natives, a symmetric reasoning applies: When foreigners are relatively liberal
(ψ ≥ 1), private consumption ch decreases while public good provision g increases with political
rights (τ0 increases and µ0 decreases with w). An increase in ψ is such that a marginal increase
in political rights leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, which decrease the marginal bene-
fit of political rights for high-skill natives as their after-tax private consumption ch decreases.
Moreover, the spending policy µ0 puts relatively more weight on the financing of public good
provision and these additional tax proceeds are spent in a way that is even further away from
high-skill natives’ relative taste for the public and the private good23. Therefore, by increasing
the tax rate and spending public funds in a less profitable way, an increase in ψ always decreases
the marginal benefit of political rights for high-skill natives, and w∗h decreases with ψ.
On the contrary, when foreigners are relatively conservative (ψ ≤ 1), private consumption ch
increases while public good provision g decreases with political rights (τ0 decreases and µ0 in-
creases with w). As is the case when ψ ≥ 1, an increase in ψ is such that a marginal increase in
political rights leads to relatively greater tax proceeds, which decreases the marginal benefit of
political rights for high-skill natives. However, these additional tax proceeds may be spent in a
way that is better aligned with high-skill natives’ relative taste for the public and the private
good: In particular, as long as foreigners’ average valuation of the public good αm is lower
than αh, an increase in ψ implies that a marginal increase in w will redistribute tax proceeds
according to a spending policy that is closer to high-skill natives’ preferences24. When this
positive impact dominates the negative tax-rate effect of ψ on the marginal impact of political
rights, an increase in ψ becomes profitable and w∗h increases with ψ.
22The gap between αl and αm gets smaller when ψ increases as long as αm is lower than αl
23When dg
dw
> 0 and αm > αn, the gap between αh and αm gets bigger as ψ increases since we have trivially
that αh < αn < αm.
24The gap between αh and αm gets smaller as ψ increases whenever αm is lower than αh
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Proposition 7: When foreigners are more conservative than natives (ψ ≤ 1), low-skill na-
tives’ preferred level of political rights w∗l increases with the share of low-skill immigrants λ
m
l .
Moreover, w∗h increases with λ
m
l for sufficiently low values of αm, and decreases otherwise.
When foreigners are more liberal than natives (ψ ≥ 1), low-skill natives preferred level of po-
litical rights w∗l increases with the share of low-skill immigrants λ
m
l for sufficiently low values
of αm, and decreases with λ
m
l otherwise. Moreover, w
∗
h always decreases with λ
m
l . Finally, if
w∗l increases with ψ, then it increases with λ
m
l . If w
∗
l increases with λ
m
l , then it increases with ψ.
The effect of an increase in λml on the marginal impact of political rights is two-fold: The
first channel through which it operates increases the share of immigrants that receive private
transfers and therefore the marginal impact of political rights on the labour income tax and
the size of private transfers. The second channel is comparable to the effect of an increase in
ψ described previously, where foreigners are in favour of taxing labour income more in order to
finance a greater taste for the public good, and their relative valuation of the public good w.r.t
to private transfers increases.
Because the former of these two channels is unambiguously profitable for low-skill natives, only
the latter matters for the sign of
dw∗l
dλml
, and the intuition is the same as in Proposition 6. Low-skill
natives’ preferred level of political rights w∗l therefore increases with λ
m
l as long as foreigners’
average relative taste for the public good αm is sufficiently close to that of low-skill natives αl.
However, because λml also increases the share of immigrants that receive private transfers, the
positive effect of λml on the marginal impact of political rights on τ is greater than when ψ
increases, and the aggregate effect of λml on w
∗
l will remain positive for greater values of αm
and a larger gap between low-skill natives’ and foreigners’ relatives preferences for the public
good αl − αm.
For high-skill natives, the effect of an increase in λml on the share of immigrants that receive
private transfers has a symmetric, negative impact on w∗h. Therefore, w
∗
h may increase with λ
m
l
when αm is lower than αh, although under more restrictive conditions than those of Proposition
6.
The comparative statics presented in Propositions 6 and 7 therefore provide a set of original
predictions about natives’ attitudes towards foreigners’ political rights. We find that low-skill
natives’ support for enfranchisement is not monotonically increasing in the share of low-skill im-
migrants or the cultural preferences of immigrants for public spending. Because redistribution
operates through two distinct policies - τ and µ - to finance a private and a public good, natives’
relative taste between both goods is a critical driver of their attitudes towards enfranchisement.
More specifically, when foreigners’ skill composition and economic conservatism are such that
their average relative preference for the public over the private good is too high with respect
to natives’, a higher share of low-skill immigrants or more pro-redistribution beliefs decreases
the marginal benefit of political rights for low-skill natives: The marginal utility cost of spend-
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ing a higher share of government funds on public goods is too high relative to the marginal
utility gains from immigrants helping to increase the size of tax proceeds. Low-skill natives
then support lower levels of political participation despite immigrants being more liberal and
less skilled than natives. On the contrary, high-skill natives can support greater political rights
for relatively less skilled foreigners if increasing the share of low-skill immigrants compensates
for relatively conservative views about public spending. The marginal utility cost of taxing
skilled natives’ labour income is then sufficiently low relative to the marginal utility gains from
immigrants helping to spend more on public goods, which can only be financed via govern-
ment redistribution. High-skill natives then support higher levels of political participation even
though immigrants are more liberal and less skilled than natives.
This last section describes how the skill composition and cultural preferences of foreign residents
influence the attitudes of native citizens towards the concession of political rights. In the next
section, we test more specifically the prediction that low-skill natives are more supportive of
foreigners’ political rights when these foreigners are poorer and hold more liberal beliefs towards
public spending.
5. Empirical evidence
5.1 Local voting rights in Switzerland
In this section, we test some of the main predictions of the model using Swiss municipal data. We
choose Switzerland as a case study because of its unique political institutions. First, Switzerland
is a country where a significant level of financial and political autonomy is delegated to subna-
tional levels of government, either regional (Canton) or municipal (Communes). Under the laws
of the Federal Constitution, cantons have extensive powers to enact their own legislation and
in particular extend voting rights to foreign nationals in cantonal and municipal elections. In
practice, while most cantons do not enfranchise their foreign residents, between 1990 and 2014,
over 30 regional referenda asked Swiss citizens from 14 different cantons their opinions about
enfranchising foreign residents25. Although most of these referenda were bundled into a process
of broader constitutional revision, a few of them asked citizens specifically it they wanted to
grant political rights to foreign residents. Moreover, due to a high level of decentralization,
local authorities in Switzerland enjoy a significant amount of financial responsibilities: Can-
tons and municipalities are jointly responsible for the implementation and financing of welfare
programmes. While municipalities are statutorily required to provide social assistance to poor
residents subject to a binding minimum standard under the cantonal law, local administrations
nevertheless retain some control over the final level of distributed cash benefits. Municipalities
also have control over various policy areas such as healthcare, primary and secondary education,
environmental issues, order and security, public administration, financial and economic affairs,
25”Pour la participation politique des etrangers au niveau local”, Adler et al. 2015.
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to which they allocate the remainder of their budget26. The delegation of substantial financial
responsibilities to local authorities comes with significant tax autonomy: Swiss municipalities
have the ability to collect taxes on personal income and wealth (concurrently with the cantonal
and federal authorities) as well as corporate profits, and thus finance a large portion of their
expenditures through their own revenues.
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to assume that the opinion of Swiss voters regarding
local franchise extension was motivated by economic considerations and in particular the con-
sequences of these voting rights on the size and composition of local public spending. In this
regard, our model predicts that the score of these referenda should depend on foreigners’ rela-
tive economic position and cultural preferences. Foreigners in Switzerland as in many European
countries suffer from poorer integration into the labour market than their native counterparts,
resulting in higher unemployment rates and lower economic status. At the national level, the
unemployment rate amongst foreign residents in 2010 was almost three times as high as among
Swiss natives (8, 9% against 3, 3%), and the poverty rate twice as high (21, 4 against 10, 4%).
Moreover, while only one in four people residing in Switzerland is a foreigner, they represent
almost 50% of ”Aide Sociale Economique”27 beneficiaries at the national level. This pattern
holds at the regional level, where foreigners are overrepresented amongst welfare recipients in
all 26 cantons, and our estimation suggests that foreigners are also poorer than natives in the
vast majority of municipalities28. Moreover, Switzerland is a notoriously conservative country
when it comes to public spending. According to several international surveys such as the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS), individual
support for public spending in most of the countries from which foreigners residing in Switzer-
land emigrated are more liberal than those of Swiss natives29.
In light of the context in which these referenda took place, the theoretical perspective adopted
in this paper has several implications. First, according to Proposition 4, low-skill natives will
support foreigners’ enfranchisement when these foreigners are relatively less skilled and hold
more liberal beliefs about public spending than natives, while high-skill natives will oppose
it.30 We therefore expect support for the enfranchisement of foreigners to increase with the
municipal share of low-skill natives. In addition, Proposition 6 and 7 predict that low-skill
natives’ support for enfranchisement w∗l will increase with the share of low-skill workers λ
m
l
and foreigners’ cultural preferences for public spending ψ on the condition that foreigners’ rel-
ative preferences for the public good αm are sufficiently low. In the notation of the model,
αm = ψ[λ
m
l (αl − αh) + αh] is an increasing function of λml , the share of low-skill foreigners. In
26The range and depth of their responsibilities over these various items also vary across regions.
27”Aide Social Economique” is the main social assistance scheme in Switzerland.
28Source: Federal Statistical Office, ”Statistique de l’aide sociale (SAS)”. See Appendix and Figure 7 for details
at the municipal level.
29see the Variable section and author’s own calculations in Appendix and Table 5 for more detailed evidence
from the ISSP survey module on the role of government.
30This corresponds to the parameter space depicted in the upper-right corner of Figure 4 in Section 3.3, where
w∗l > 0 and w
∗
h = 0.
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Switzerland, the share of low-skill foreigners as per the definition of our theoretical model is
relatively low31, and we therefore assume that the previous condition is satisfied. As a result,
Proposition 6 imply that an increase in the municipal share of low-skill foreign-born residents
should be associated with increased support for enfranchisement among low-skill natives. Like-
wise, according to Proposition 7, we expect the support for foreigners’ enfranchisement among
low-skill natives to increase when foreigners residing in the same municipality have more lib-
eral views about the role of government in the provision of public goods. In order to examine
these predictions, we proxy the share of low-skill native voters and foreigners using the share of
individuals receiving cash transfers in the population. We also build an index of economic con-
servatism based on the average preferences for public spending in immigrants’ origin countries
as a measure of pro-redistribution culture among foreign residents. We then test the following
hypotheses:
H1: Municipalities in which a greater share of natives received welfare benefits should be more
supportive of the enfranchisement of foreigners.
H2: Support for foreigners’ enfranchisement should increase more strongly with the share of
natives receiving welfare benefits in municipalities where a greater share of foreigners received
welfare benefits.
H3: Support for foreigners’ enfranchisement should increase more strongly with the share of
natives receiving welfare benefits in municipalities where foreigners had greater cultural prefer-
ences for public spending.
5.2 Data
In this study, we assemble an original dataset which combines information about municipal
scores in six referenda conducted between 2005 and 2014 in the Cantons of Geneva, Bern,
Schaffhausen, Zurich, Luzern, and Vaud32. We also use data from the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office and the regional statistical offices of various Swiss cantons to collect several economic and
political variables at the municipal level. Data on municipal parliaments were kindly provided
by Pr. Andreas Ladner.
We construct an original measure of foreigners’ relative poverty and cultural preferences for
public spending at the municipal level. To proxy the former, we estimate foreigners’ relative
welfare dependency, i.e the difference in the share of welfare-dependent residents in the native
31We identify as low-skill workers in the model those individuals who benefit from income redistribution through
publicly funded cash transfers. In practice, only 6% of foreign-born workers receive such transfers in Switzerland.
32More information about the nature of these referenda is available in Table 6
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and foreign population. We focus specifically on individuals who receive cash transfers under
the ”Aide Sociale Economique” programme33. Because this variable is not directly available for
foreign residents at the municipal level, we first extract the share of individuals receiving the
ASE transfer for each nationality at the regional level, and impute the share of welfare recipients
at the municipal level according to the share of each nationality in the municipal population34.
Following Luttmer (2011), we measure the cultural preferences of foreign residents about the
role of government in the provision of public goods and services based on their country of origin.
Luttmer shows that the birth country’s cultural preferences for redistribution of a European
immigrant is a strong predictor of that immigrants’ individual taste for redistribution, and that
this effect persists for those immigrants who have lived many years, have become citizens, and
have been granted the right to vote in their country of residence. Moreover, he finds that im-
migrants from countries with a greater taste for redistribution are more likely to vote for more
pro-redistribution parties, which gives further credit to the theoretical mechanism identified in
the model whereby low-income natives support the enfranchisement of foreigners insofar as they
hope to secure greater redistribution thanks to their political influence. Our variable capturing
cultural preferences is constructed using a two-step process. First, we build an international
index of economic conservatism which captures country-specific preferences for public spending.
To do this, we use survey data from three rounds of the ISSP survey (1996, 2006, and 2016),
which measures attitudes towards the role of government across countries and over time, and
extract the country-specific effect driving individual preferences towards government’s responsi-
bility to provide jobs and public services. Second, we compute a weighted average of foreigners’
cultural preferences for redistribution at the municipal level by imputing scores according to
the share of each nationality in the municipal population35.
Our final sample comprises around 690 municipalities for which descriptive statistics are pro-
vided in Table 1.
33The Aide Sociale programme is a means-tested, poverty relief programs to which low-income residents are
eligible when they are not part of any other targeted social insurance or welfare scheme.
34More details on the construction of this variable are available in Appendix.
35More details on the wording of the questions about attitudes towards the role of government and the con-
struction of this variable are available in Appendix. In practice, because not all countries whose nationals have
emigrated to Switzerland are surveyed by the ISSP, our conservatism index does not cover one hundred percent
of the foreign population in a municipality. We therefore only include in our final sample municipalities in which
data on cultural redistributive preferences were available for at least 70% of the municipal foreign population.
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5.3 Empirical strategy
To examine the effect of the share of welfare-dependent natives on the willingness of a munic-
ipality to enfranchise foreigners and how this effect varies with the relative economic position
and cultural preferences of these foreigners, we fit the following model:
yij = αShare welfarei + β Zi + γ Share welfarei × Zi + δXi + µj + ij
where yij is the percentage of votes in favour of foreigners’ political rights in municipality
i and canton j, Share welfarei denotes the share of welfare beneficiaries in the municipal
resident population36, Zi corresponds alternatively to foreigners’ cultural preferences for public
spending or their relative welfare-dependency. In the baseline model, we also include a set of
control variables Xi that are likely to influence the result of a referendum on foreign voting
rights. These control variables include the turnout rate and the logarithms of the population
and mean income. Since there also exist non-economic (such as religious and ethnic) drivers of
the preferences of natives toward foreigners’ political rights, we also control for the municipal
share of residents with non-European origins. Finally, we include canton dummies to capture the
effect of regional characteristics (such as language or culture) and the purpose of the referendum,
which was the direct implementation of foreign voting rights in some cantons but only included
the possibility of opting-in in others - See Table 6.
5.4 Results
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the results of the baseline model with controls, excluding for-
eigners’ welfare dependency and economic conservatism as regressors. The coefficient for the
share of welfare recipients in a municipality is positive and significant, and suggests that a
one percent increase in the share of welfare recipients in an average municipality increases the
referendum score by 1.51 percentage points. This result provides support for hypothesis H1
that municipalities with a greater share of welfare-dependent natives are more likely to support
the enfranchisement of foreigners. This effect holds for the fuller specification in column (2),
where we add as explanatory variables the relative welfare dependency and cultural preferences
of foreigners. The coefficient for the cultural preferences of foreigners for public spending is
positive and significant, suggesting that it increases the support for the enfranchisement of
foreign residents within a municipality independently of the share of low-income residents. A
possible explanation behind this coefficient is that cultural preferences for public spending are
correlated with other cultural or social preferences that are likely to positively influence the
36The share of welfare beneficiaries in the resident population can be regarded as an acceptable measure of
natives’ welfare dependency as long as the relative size of the foreign population is low enough. In our final
sample, foreigners represent on average 14% of the municipal resident population.
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willingness of native residents to enfranchise foreigners. Regarding the impact of immigrants’
skill level on the effect of the share of welfare beneficiaries, the coefficient for the interaction
term in column (3) is statistically significant and has the expected positive sign, indicating that
municipalities where the share of welfare recipients is greater support foreigners’ political rights
more strongly when foreigners are relatively poorer. Likewise, the interaction term in column
(4) returns a positive and statistically significant coefficient which indicates that an increase in
the share of welfare beneficiaries will have a stronger positive effect on the support for foreigners’
enfranchisement in municipalities where foreigners have greater preferences for public spending.
This result corroborates hypothesis H3 that low-income natives will be more supportive of the
political integration of foreigners when the latter hold more liberal beliefs about redistribution
as they expect a greater increase in the size of the pro-redistribution voters.
Turning to the control variables, our estimates suggest that richer and more ethnically homoge-
neous municipalities - in which the total share of non-European population is lower - voted more
in favour of non-citizen enfranchisement. Although not statistically significant in the baseline
regression, the negative coefficient for the share of non-EU residents is in line with our intu-
ition that natives usually have more restrictive attitudes towards foreigners that come from a
different ethnic background. To the extent that the mean income reflects the average level of
education in a municipality, the positive income coefficient could be interpreted as less hostile
views about immigration in more educated municipalities independently of the share of welfare
recipients, which represents in fine a small fraction of the population37.
These findings provide empirical support for all our three hypotheses and the mechanisms
identified in the theoretical model: We find that municipalities where a greater share of people
receive welfare transfers are more likely to support the enfranchisement of foreigners, and that
this effect is stronger when foreigners are relatively poorer and emigrated from countries with
more liberal attitudes towards public spending.
5.5 Robustness
Our findings are robust to alternative specifications and the inclusion of richer demographic,
economic, and political control variables. Column (1) of Table 3 reports our baseline coefficients
without interaction for a specification with only canton dummies as controls. Although lower
in magnitude, the coefficient for the share of welfare beneficiaries in the total population is still
highly significant. Column (2) offers an alternative measure for the share of low-skill natives,
where the share of welfare recipients is replaced by the unemployment rate at the municipal
level. The coefficient is positive and very significant, suggesting that a one percent increase in
unemployment rate in an average municipality increases the referendum score by 2.7 percent-
age point. Column (3) to (5) report significant coefficients for specifications where we use the
log of the median income and the Gini coefficient as alternative measures of municipal wealth.
Next, we run specifications that include a more comprehensive list of control variables: We
37This result is in line with the evidence in the literature that more educated natives are less hostile to
immigration regardless of redistribution concerns - see for instance Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010)
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control for demographic characteristics through the relative share of school-aged population
and elders among natives and foreigners, as well as the average age of the municipal resident
population. To refine our measurement of non-economic drivers, we also include the share of
muslim individuals in the resident population and control for violations of the Federal law on
foreigners (LEtr), a legislation that contains measures on immigration of foreign individuals,
family reunification, and integration policy as well as law and order. Moreover, we consider the
possibility that natives’ decision to support foreign voting rights could be influenced by the per-
ceived impact of political integration on selective migration, for instance if political rights were
to affect the quantity and the quality of immigration by acting as a welfare magnet for low-skill
immigrants. We control for this channel with the net inflows of international immigrants at
the municipal level in the three years prior to the referendum. Finally, we also add a dummy
variable for whether or not the municipality has an elected municipal parliament38. The results
in Column (6) to (8) show that the coefficients remain significant and very close in magnitude
to those reported in the baseline model when we add that full set of controls. Although slightly
lower than in the baseline model (1.38), the coefficient for the share of welfare recipient - Col
(6) - remains strongly significant. Moreover, the interaction coefficients in Column (7) and
(8) suggests that the mediating effect of foreigners’ relative welfare dependency and cultural
preferences for public spending hardly varies with comprehensive controls. These coefficients
are respectively 0.22 and 9.43 against 0.24 and 9.98 in the baseline model, and their level of
statistical significance remains unchanged.
We also test the robustness of our results to the choice of sample. For example, our results
are robust to using different threshold values of the share of foreigners covered by our index of
economic conservatism preferences (Table 4). We also run our regressions on a subsample that
includes only municipalities which voted about foreign municipal voting rights (thus exclud-
ing regional voting rights referenda) or focusing on municipalities where the share of welfare
beneficiaries was strictly greater than 0 (see Table 5)
6. Conclusion
We propose in this paper a new theoretical framework to explore the consequences of foreign-
ers’ political rights on redistribution and natives’ attitudes towards non-citizen enfranchisement.
Our model is the first to account for both economic and cultural drivers of preferences for re-
distribution and distinguish between public spending on private and public goods in order to
understand how the extension of the franchise to foreign residents can influence a country’s
spending policy.
We find that low-skill natives are more likely to grant political rights to foreign residents when
38In Switzerland, all municipalities elect an executive council but the decisional power when it comes to budget,
tax rates and other investment projects at the city level lies in the hands of a legislative council. While in bigger
municipalities this council takes the form of an elected municipal parliament, enfranchised citizens can exercise
their right to vote on municipal budgets and policies in municipal assemblies which meet several times a year in
smaller municipalities
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these foreigners are relatively less skilled and have greater cultural preferences for public spend-
ing. In particular, contrary to the commonly held assumption in the political economy literature
that low-skill natives would only support the enfranchisement of poorer foreigners, we show that
they are willing to enfranchise relatively skilled foreigners as long as these foreigners have suffi-
ciently liberal beliefs towards public spending. We also establish that the extent of the political
rights that low-skill natives are prepared to grant them is not monotonically increasing with the
share of low-skill foreigners or their cultural support for public expenditure. Rather, low-skill
natives prefer to grant fewer political rights to less-skilled or more liberal immigrants when
those immigrants’ relative preferences for the private and the public good are too different from
their own.
We also test empirically some of the predictions of the model using an original municipality-
level dataset of Swiss referenda about non-citizen voting rights. In line with our theoretical
intuition, we find that municipalities where a greater share of natives received social transfers
were more likely to support immigrant voting, and that this effect was stronger where foreigners
were poorer and emigrated from countries with stronger redistributive preferences.
From a public policy perspective, our paper provides a richer picture of the political preferences
of native and foreign residents and shows why immigrants’ cultural preferences about public
spending are key to understand the fiscal implications of immigration on both redistribution and
integration policies. Our work is therefore relevant for public life to help inform future political
strategies regarding immigration rights and ensure the successful integration and social inclusion
of foreign-born populations
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 and 2
Lemma 1 and 2 comes immediately from the expression of the FOCs.
Proof of Proposition 1.1
Proposition 1.1 comes immediately from observing that τn and µn are respectively increasing
and decreasing with αl, αh, and ψn.
Proof of Proposition 1.2
Let F ′l =
dFl
dλnl
= ylyh(1+M)
Y 2
. From the expression of τn, we have that
dτn
dλnl
≥ 0 is equivalent
to
−
[(1 + αn)(1− Fl)− (1− λnl )[ψn(αl − αh)(1− Fl)− (1 + αn)F ′l ](
(1 + αn)(1− Fl)
)2 ≥ 0 (16)
⇔ F ′l (1− λnl )(1 + αn) ≤ (1− Fl)
[
1 + αn + (1− λnl )ψn(αl − αh)
]
(17)
⇔ F ′l (1− λnl )(1 + αn) ≤ (1− Fl)(1 + ψnαl) (18)
⇔ (1− λ
n
l )
1− Fl ≤
1 + ψnαl
(1 + αn)F ′l
(19)
where because ψnαl > αn, we have immediately that the RHS of (19) is greater than
1
F ′l
.
Therefore, it suffices that 1
F ′l
is greater than the LHS of (19) for τn to increase with λ
n
l . Let us
check that 1
F ′l
≥ (1−λnl )1−Fl is indeed satisfied. From the expression of Fl and F ′l we obtain
1
F ′l
≥ 1− λ
n
l
1− Fl (20)
⇔ Y
2
ylyh(1 +M)
≥ (1− λ
n
l )Y
Lhyh
(21)
⇔ y¯Lh ≥ (1− λnl )yl (22)
where y¯ = Y1+M is the average income in the economy. Because, y¯ > yl and Lh > (1− λnl ), (22)
is trivially satisfied. Therefore, (19) is satisfied as well and dτndλnl
≥ 0.
Turning to µn, we have that
dµn
dλnl
≥ 0 is equivalent to
40
−
[(1 + αn)(1− Fl)− (1− λnl )[ψn(αl − αh)(1− Fl)− (1 + αn)F ′l ](
(1 + αn)(1− Fl)
)2 ≥ 0 (23)
⇔ (1− λ
n
l )
1− Fl ≤
ψn(αlFl + (1− Fl)αh)
αnF ′l
(24)
Trivial algebra proves that the RHS of (24) is increasing with αh when λ
n
l > Fl. We then have
ψn(αlFl+(1−Fl)αh)
αnF ′l
≥ ψnαlFl
ψnαlλ
n
l F
′
l
= Fl
λnl F
′
l
39, and it suffices therefore that Fl
λnl F
′
l
is greater than the
LHS of (24) for µn to increase with λ
n
l . Let us check that
Fl
λnl F
′
l
≥ (1−λnl )1−Fl is indeed satisfied.
From the expression of Fl and F
′
l we obtain
Fl
λnl F
′
l
≥ (1− λ
n
l )
1− Fl (25)
⇔ ylyh(Ll + Lh)(1− λ
n
l )λ
n
l
Y 2
≤ ylyhLlLh
Y 2
(26)
⇔ (Ll + Lh)(1− λnl )λnl ≤ LlLh (27)
⇔ (1− λnl )2λml ≥ −(1− λml )((λnl )2 +Mλml ) (28)
which is trivially satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 1.3
Notice that dFldγ ≤ 0, from which we have trivially using the chain rule that dτndγ ≥ 0. Moreover,
simple algebra gives us that 1−Flλnl −Fl is increasing with Fl, which leads to the same result for µn
under the assumption that λnl > Fl. 
Proof of Proposition 1.4
Using the chain rule, we have that dτndλml
= dτndFl
dFl
dλml
, which implies dτndλml
≤ 0 since dτndFl is negative
and dFldλml
is positive. A similar argument gives us dµndλml
≤ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1
The derivative of τ0 with respect to w writes
dτ0
dw = − M1−Fl
(1−λml )(1+αn)−(1−λnl )(1+αm)
(1+αp(w)+wM)2
, which is
positive if and only if 1+αn1+αm ≤
1−λnl
1−λml .
39where ψnαlFl
ψnαlλ
n
l
F ′
l
is the expression of the RHS of (24) when αh = 0
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The derivative of µ0 with respect to w is
− M
1−Fl
αm(λ
n
l −Fl)−αn(λ
m
l −Fl)
(λn
l
−Fl+Mw(λml −Fl))2(
1+
αp(w)(1−Fl)
λn
l
−Fl+Mw(λml −Fl)
)2 , which is positive if and only
if αmαn ≤
λml −Fl
λnl −Fl . 
Proof of Proposition 2.2
To prove the first part of Proposition 2.2, we must show that if ψ < 1 and λml > λ
n
l , then
αm
αn
≤ λml −Flλnl −Fl .
αm
αn
≤ λml −Flλnl −Fl is equivalent to αn(λ
m
l − Fl) ≥ αm(λnl − Fl). Because ψ < 1, we also have that
αm < αlλ
m
l + (1 − λml )αh, which gives us αm(λnl − Fl) <
[
αlλ
m
l + (1 − λml )αh
]
(λnl − Fl). By
transitivity, it suffices to show that αn(λ
m
l − Fl) ≥
[
αlλ
m
l + (1− λml )αh
]
(λnl − Fl) to complete
the proof. Notice that
αn(λ
m
l − Fl) ≥
[
αlλ
m
l + (1− λml )αh
]
(λnl − Fl) (29)
⇔[αlλnl + (1− λnl )αh](λml − Fl) ≥ [αlλml + (1− λml )αh](λnl − Fl) (30)
which simplifies to
(
αh + Fl(αl − αh)
)
(λml − λnl ) ≥ 0 and is trivially satisfied if λml > λnl . 
Moreover, we have to prove dτ0dw > 0 ⇒ dµ0dw if ψ < 1, which is equivalent to showing 1+αn1+αm ≤
1−λnl
1−λml ⇒
αm
αn
≤ λml −Flλnl −Fl .
Suppose 1+αn1+αm ≤
1−λnl
1−λml . If ψ < 1, then αm < αlλ
m
l + (1 − λml )αh, which by transitivity gives
us
1− λnl
1− λml
≥ 1 + αn
1 + αm
≥ 1 + αn
1 + αlλ
m
l + (1− λml )αh
(31)
After some trivial algebra,
1−λnl
1−λml ≥
1+αn
1+αlλ
m
l +(1−λml )αh simplifies to (1 + αl)(λ
m
l − λnl ) ≥ 0, which
implies λml ≥ λnl . Using that if ψ < 1 and λml ≥ λnl , then dµ0dw > 0 (which was proved above),
we have indeed that dτ0dw > 0⇒ dµ0dw if ψ < 1. 
The second part of the proof (for ψ > 1) is obtained using a symmetric reasoning.
Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proposition 2.3 is obtained after some trivial algebra on the expression of c and g in (10) and
(11).
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Proof of Lemma 3
To prove Lemma 3, we must prove that V is strictly quasi-concave in w for both types of natives,
i.e we must show that the following SOC is satisfied40:
d2Vi
d2w
= M
[
− (λ
m
i )
2
(λni + λ
m
i Mw)
2
− αiα
2
m
α2p
+
(1 + αi)(1 + αm)
2
(1 + wM + αp)2
]
< 0 (32)
Notice that the FOC for low-skill natives writes
dVl
dw
= 0⇔M
[
λml
λnl + λ
m
l Mw
+
αlαm
αp
− (1 + αl)(1 + αm)
1 + wM + αp
]
= 0,
which gives us (1+αl)(1+αm)1+wM+αp =
λml
λnl +λ
m
l Mw
+ αlαmαp ⇒
( (1+αm)
1+wM+αp
)2
= 1
(1+αl)2
(
λml
λnl +λ
m
l Mw
+ αlαmαp
)2
.
Therefore, the SOC for low-skill natives can be expressed as the following inequality:
− (λ
m
l )
2
(λnl + λ
m
l Mw)
2
− αlα
2
m
α2p
+
1
(1 + αl)
( λml
λnl + λ
m
l Mw
+
αlαm
αp
)2
< 0 (33)
⇔ (1− (1 + αl)) (λ
m
l )
2
(λnl + λ
m
l Mw)
2
+ (αl − (1 + αl))αlα
2
m
α2p
+
2λml αlαm
(λnl + λ
m
l Mw)αp)
< 0 (34)
− αl
[ λml
λnl + λ
m
l Mw
− αm
αp
]2
< 0 (35)
which is unambiguously negative. .
Proof of Proposition 3
Using the strict quasi-concavity of Vi
41, we have that w∗i > 0 if and only if the derivative of Vi
with respect to w is positive at w = 0. This conditions (dVidw |w=0 ≥ 0) writes
λmi
λni
+
αiαm
αn
− (1 + αi)(1 + αm)
1 + αn
≥ 0 (36)
⇔ (1 + αn)(αnλmi + αiαmλni )− αn(1 + αi)(1 + αm)λni ≥ 0 (37)
(1 + αn)αnλ
m
i ≥ λni (αn(1 + αi)(1 + αm)− αiαm(1 + αn)) (38)
(1 + αn)λ
m
i − λni (1 + αi + αm(1−
αi
αn
)) ≥ 0 (39)
λmi
[
(1 + αn)− ψ(αi − α−i)(1− αi
αn
)λni
]− λni [1 + αi + ψα−i(1− αiαn )] ≥ 0 (40)
λmi ≥
1 + αi + ψα−i(1− αiαn )
1+αn
λni
+ ψ(αi − α−i)( αiαn − 1)
(41)
40We only detail the proof for low-skill natives (Vl) as a symmetric reasoning can be used to obtain the result
for high-skill natives
41As in Lemma 3, we prove the Proposition for low-skill natives only
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To prove wl > 0 ⇔ wh = 0, it is then enough to show that λml ≥ λl ⇔ λmh ≤ λh. First,
notice that λi can write
(1+αi+αm(1− αiαn ))
(1+αn)
λni
42, and we therefore have to prove that λml ≥
(1+αl+αm(1− αlαn ))
(1+αn)
λnl ⇔ λmh ≤
(1+αh+αm(1−αhαn ))
(1+αn)
λnh. Using that αl =
αn−(1−λnl )αh
λnl
, we have
λml ≥
(1 + αm + αl(1− αmαn ))
(1 + αn)
λnl (42)
⇔λml (1 + αn) ≥
(
1 + αm + (1− αm
αn
)
(αn − (1− λnl )αh)
λnl
)
λnl (43)
⇔λml (1 + αn) ≥ (1 + αm)λnl + (1−
αm
αn
)(αn − (1− λnl )αh) (44)
⇔λml (1 + αn) ≥ λnl − (1− λnl )αm − αh(1− λnl )(1−
αm
αn
) + αn (45)
⇔(λml − 1)(1 + αn) ≥ λnl − 1− (1− λnl )(αm + αh(1−
αm
αn
)) (46)
⇔1− λml ≤
1 + αm + αh(1− αmαn )
1 + αn
(1− λnl ) (47)
⇔λmh ≤
1 + αm + αh(1− αmαn )
1 + αn
λnh (48)
.
Proof of Proposition 4
The first part of proposition 4 was already proven in (41), where λi =
1+αi+ψα−i(1− αiαn )
1+αn
λn
i
+ψ(αi−α−i)( αiαn−1)
.
Using that λi =
(1+αi+αm(1− αiαn ))
(1+αn)
λni , trivial algebra gives us
dλl
dλnl
≥ 0, dλldψ ≤ 0,
dλh
dλnh
≥ 0, and
dλh
dψ ≥ 0.
Finally, we must show that λl ≥ λnl and λh ≤ λnh if and only if ψ ≤ 1.
First, we prove that λi = λ
n
i if and only if ψ = 1.
Notice that ψ = 1 implies λi =
1+αi+α−i(1− αiαn )
1+αn
λn
i
+(αi−α−i)( αiαn−1)
= λni
1+αi−α−i
(
(1−λni )(αi−α−i)
αn
)
1+αn+λni (αi−α−i)
(
(1−λn
i
)(αi−α−i)
αn
) .
Moreover, we have that 1+αn+λ
n
i (αi−α−i)
( (1−λni )(αi−α−i)
αn
)−[1+αi−α−i( (1−λni )(αi−α−i)αn )] = 0,
which implies λi = λ
n
i .
Also if λi = λ
n
i , then 1+αn+ψλ
n
i (αi−α−i)
( (1−λni )(αi−α−i)
αn
)
=
[
1+αi−ψα−i
( (1−λni )(αi−α−i)
αn
)]
,
which implies ψ
(αi−α−i)(1−λni )(λni (αi−α−i)+α−i)
αn
= (αi − α−i)(1− λni ), and ψ = 1.
42This comes immediately from the expression of (23)
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Therefore, λi = λ
n
i if and only if ψ = 1. Moreover, we know from the first part of Proposition
4 that
dλl
dψ ≤ 0 and
dλh
dψ ≥ 0. It is then easy to complete the proof. .
Proof of Proposition 5
Rewriting the FOC of Vi, we have
αpλ
m
i (1 + wM + αp) + αiαm(1 + wM + αp))(λ
n
i + λ
m
i Mw) = αp(1 + αi)(1 + αm)(λ
n
i + λ
m
i Mw)
(49)
⇔ wMαm
[
λni (1 + αm)− λmi (1 + αn + αi(1−
αn
αm
))
]
= αn
[
λmi (1 + αn)− λni (1 + αm + αi(1−
αm
αn
))
]
(50)
⇔ w = 1
M
( αn[λmi (1 + αn)− λli(1 + αm + αi(1− αmαn ))]
αm
[
λli(1 + αm)− λmi (1 + αn + αi(1− αnαm ))
]) (51)
which gives us a closed form expression of w∗i . It comes immediately from the expression of w
∗
i
in (51) that w∗i decreases with M . 
Proof of Proposition 6
We prove the proposition for low-skill natives.
Proposition 6 can be proven applying the Implicit Function Theorem and calculating the sign
of −
d2Vl
dwdψ
d2Vl
d2w
, which in turn gives us the sign of
dw∗l
dψ . That
d2Vl
d2w
is negative has already been
established in the proof of Lemma 3. We are thus left to check under which conditions d
2Vl
dwdψ is
positive. From the expression of dVldw , we have that
d2Vl
dwdψ
=
αlαn
α2p
− (1 + αl)(1 + αn)
(1 + wM + αp)2
(52)
which is positive whenever
αlαn
α2p
− (1 + αl)(1 + αn)
(1 + wM + αp)2
≥ 0 (53)
⇔ −α2p(1 + αl)(1 + αn) + αlαn(1 + wM + αp)2 ≥ 0 (54)
⇔ −α2p(1 + +αn + αl) + αp(2αnαl(1 + wM)) + αlαn(1 + wM)2 ≥ 0 (55)
Let Q(x) = −x2(1 + +αn +αl) + x(2αnαl(1 +wM)) +αlαn(1 +wM)2. Trivial algebra gives us
that the unique positive root of Q is
x =
αlαn(1 + wM)
1 + αn + αl
[
1 +
(
1 +
1 + αn + αl
αlαn
) 1
2
]
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from which we have that (55) is equivalent to
αp ≤ αlαn(1 + wM)
1 + αn + αl
[
1 +
(
1 +
1 + αn + αl
αlαn
) 1
2
]
(56)
⇔ αm ≤ αn
wM
[
αl(1 + wM)
1 + αn + αl
[
1 +
(
1 +
1 + αn + αl
αlαn
) 1
2
]
− 1
]
(57)
which is satisfied when αm is sufficiently small.
Moreover, we have to prove that if ψ < 1, then w∗l is increasing with ψ. Recall that if w
∗
l ∈ (0, 1)
and ψ < 1, then dgdw ≤ 0, which implies αm < αn.
Also, we can show that (57) holds for αm = αn. Indeed, observe that
αn ≤ αn
wM
[
αl(1 + wM)
1 + αn + αl
[
1 +
(
1 +
1 + αn + αl
αlαn
) 1
2
]
− 1
]
(58)
⇔ 1 + αn + αl
αl
≤ 1 + (1 + 1 + αn + αl
αlαn
) 1
2 (59)
⇔ (1 + αn)2αn ≤ αl(1 + αn + αl + αlαn) (60)
where because (1 +αn) ≤ (1 +αn +αl +αlαn) and αn ≤ αl, (60) is trivially satisfied. By tran-
sitivity, we therefore have αm ≤ αn ≤ αnwM
[
αl(1+wM)
1+αn+αl
[
1 +
(
1 + 1+αn+αlαlαn
) 1
2
]
− 1
]
, and
dw∗l
dψ ≥ 0.

A symmetric reasoning allows to prove Proposition 6 for high-skill natives.
Proof of Proposition 7
We prove the proposition for low-skill natives.
Again, Proposition 6 can be obtained applying the Implicit Function Theorem by calculating
the sign of −
d2Vl
dwdλm
l
d2Vl
d2w
, which in turn gives us the sign of
dw∗l
dλml
. From the FOC of Vl, we have
that
d2Vl
dwdλml
=
λnl
(λni + λ
m
l Mw)
2
+ ψ(αl − αh)
[αlαn
α2p
− (1 + αl)(1 + αn)
(1 + wM + αp)2
]
(61)
The sign of this expression has already been discussed in the proof of Prop 6., from which we
have that (61) is positive when ψ is sufficiently small. 
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Referendum score (% of yes) 24.34 11.18 2.36 61.6 688
Turnout (%) 42.78 11.11 15.7 77.5 688
Log population 6.98 1.18 3.87 12.86 688
Share of foreigners in tot. pop (%) 14.01 9.45 0 51.2 688
Share of non-EU foreigners (%) 19.1 10.47 0 100 688
Log mean income 10.51 0.35 9.68 12.42 688
Log median income 10.28 0.22 9.14 10.87 688
Gini coefficient 0.47 0.08 0.34 0.9 688
Average age of tot. pop. 40.56 2.5 34.34 49.98 688
Share of Muslims in tot. pop (%) 1.46 1.65 0 16.4 688
Net inflow of for. migrants (% of tot. pop.) 0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.31 688
Dummy elders (for. vs natives) 0.03 0.18 0 1 688
Dummy school-aged pop. (for. vs natives) 0.35 0.48 0 1 688
Violations of the law on foreigners (/1000 inhab.) 1.56 4.35 0 50.83 688
Unemployment rate (%) 2.39 1.24 0 7.91 688
Parliament dummy 0.24 0.43 0 1 688
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. 1.73 1.45 0 8.97 688
Share of welfare benef. in foreign pop. (%) 5.64 3 0 15.18 688
Foreigners’ relative welfare dependence 4.52 2.58 -4.07 13.73 688
Foreigners’ cultural pref. for public spending 0.43 0.07 0.19 0.62 688
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Table 2: Main results
Yes vote [0,100]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. 1.51∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.41 -3.28∗∗
(0.32) (0.30) (0.43) (1.37)
Foreigners’ relative welfare dependency 0.19 -0.23 0.14
(0.16) (0.23) (0.16)
Foreigners’ cultural pref. for public spending 22.8∗∗∗ 18.4∗∗ 5.59
(7.45) (7.40) (8.38)
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. × Foreigners’ RWD 0.24∗∗∗
(0.094)
Share of welfare beneficiaries in tot. pop. × Foreigners’ cultural pref. for PS 9.91∗∗∗
(3.04)
Share of non-EU foreigners in tot. pop. -0.057 -0.13 -0.31∗∗ -0.26∗
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
Log mean income 3.36∗∗∗ 5.08∗∗∗ 5.17∗∗∗ 5.01∗∗∗
(1.08) (1.19) (1.19) (1.18)
Log population 0.29 0.032 0.051 0.098
(0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40)
Turnout 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058)
N 688 688 688 688
r2 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.60
Sample includes municipalities for which at least > 70% of the foreign population are covered by our index of
economic conservatism. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include canton dummies.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Additional robustness checks
Yes vote [0,100]
Municipal Voting rights only Percentage of welf. benef. > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share welfare benef. 1.75∗∗∗ -0.077 -8.21∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 0.54 -2.60∗
(0.52) (0.67) (1.37) (0.31) (0.48) (1.47)
Foreigners’ RWD 0.33 -0.30 0.19 0.27 -0.19 0.21
(0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.17) (0.27) (0.17)
Foreigners’ cult. pref. for PS 35.4∗∗∗ 30.6∗∗∗ -2.21 25.6∗∗∗ 22.9∗∗∗ 9.61
(9.24) (9.25) (9.58) (8.05) (7.97) (9.35)
Share welfare benef. × Foreigners’ RWD 0.37∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.12) (0.10)
Share welfare benef. × Foreigners’ cult. pref. for PS 22.8∗∗∗ 8.69∗∗∗
(3.26) (3.25)
N 378 378 378 649 649 649
r2 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.61
Sample includes municipalities for which at least > 70% of the foreign population are covered by our index
economic conservatism.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include baseline controls and region and time fixed effects.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Variables
Score of ’YES’ vote in referendum: Our data on municipal referendum outcomes come
from cantonal offices of statistics. The voting rule in all referenda excluded foreigners from
participating and suffrage was limited to Swiss citizens. In practice, voters were asked to vote
”yes” or ”no” to a political proposal offering to grant foreign residents local voting rights under
some residency requirements. The content of these rights can be found in Table 6 below.
Table 6: List of referendums
Canton Political rights Jurisdiction Date of referendum
Schaffhausen RV, RE, RBE MUN, CANT 2014
Zurich RV, RE, RBE MUN (opting-in) 2013
Vaud RV, RE, RBE CANT 2011
Luzern RV MUN (opting-in) 2011
Bern RV, RE, RBE MUN (opting-in) 2010
Geneva RV, RE MUN 2005
RV = Right to vote /RE = Right to elect/RBE = Right to be elected.
CANT = Canton level / MUN = Municipal level / opting-in = Possibility for municipalities to opt-in.
Log of mean / median income: Log of mean / median taxable income.
Net inflow of foreign migrants (% of tot. pop.): This variable corresponds to the ratio of
the net migratory balance (immigration - emigration) of international migrants in the three years
prior to the referendum over the total resident population in the year the referendum took place.
Dummy elders: This dummy takes value 1 when the share of people of 65 years of age or
more in the foreign population is greater than that share in the native population.
Dummy education: This dummy takes value 1 when the share of school-aged people (be-
tween 3 and 16 years of age) in the foreign population is greater than that share in the native
population.
Violations of the law on foreigners : This variable corresponds to the annual number of
registered offences against the law on foreigners (LEtr) per 1’000 inhabitants, averaged over the
three years prior to the referendum.
Municipal share of muslim residents: The share of muslims residents in the total resident
population in 2000.
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Municipal share of welfare recipients: The share of individuals in the total resident pop-
ulation receiving the ”Aide Sociale Economique” transfer.
Share of welfare recipients in the resident foreign population: We use regional census
data and several rounds of the ”Statistique de l’aide sociale (SAS)” survey from the Federal
Statistical Office to obtain the share of foreign welfare-beneficiaries by nationality at the can-
tonal level, which we store under variable Welfaredeplj , expressed as the percentage of foreign
residents of nationality j receiving financial help through the Aide Sociale programme in can-
ton l. The share of welfare recipients at the municipal level is then imputed according to the
share of each nationality in the municipal population: For a given municipality i in canton
l, we compute the weighted share of welfare beneficiaries in the foreign resident population
WDli =
∑
j
wjiWelfaredep
l
j , where the weight variable w
j
i corresponds to share of foreigners of
nationality j in municipality i.43
Foreigners’ relative welfare dependency: The relative welfare dependency of foreigners
RWDi =
WDi−Share welfarei
Nati
is obtained by taking the difference between the share of welfare
recipients in the foreign resident population WDi and the share of welfare recipients in the total
resident population Share welfarei, divided by the inverse of the share of Swiss citizens in the
total resident population Nati.
Foreigners’ cultural preferences for public spending: The data come from various rounds
of the ISSP survey module on the role of government (1996, 2000, 2006) which collected in-
formation for a total of 45 countries across 132,000 individual observations. In each round,
respondents from several countries were asked to what extent they think it is the government’s
responsibility to provide jobs and public services44. In particular, individual respondents were
offered to disagree strongly, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or agree strongly to the
following statements:
43For every municipality i, we have
∑
j
wji = 1. The average share of foreign residents for which such data are
available in our sample is 98% (w¯i > 0.98), with a minimum coverage rate of 85%. Note that the municipal
share of welfare recipients in the total resident population is directly available from federal statistical sources.
Therefore, when our proxy of the municipal share of foreign welfare recipients does not square with those federal
data, we correct for outstanding values by imputing as the share of welfare recipients in the foreign resident
population WDi the maximum possible value according to federal sources. For instance, if our proxy WDi for
municipality i is strictly greater than 0 while official data state that no individual (whether foreigner or native)
receive cash transfers in that municipality, we replace our estimate with WDi = 0.
44Some countries participate in all rounds of the survey, while other were only surveyed once.
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On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to...
• Provide a job for everyone who wants one ?
• Provide health care for the sick ?
• Provide a decent standard of living for the old ?
• Provide industry with the help it needs to grow ?
• Give financial help to university students from low-income families ?
• Provide decent housing for those who cannot afford it ?
Because these questions do not refer specifically to the government of the country that the
respondent lives in but rather ask about the state’s general responsibility, we believe that they
provide an adequate measure of individual ideological beliefs about redistribution instead of
simply capturing attitudes towards the relative level of public expenditures in the country at
the time the survey was administered. We code respondents’ answers between disagree strongly,
disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or agree strongly on a five-point scale and use the
average individual scores across all six items to measure respondents’ general attitudes towards
the role of government as provider of basic public services, which we store under variable
Pref Redi. We then perform the following OLS regression on the full sample of respondents
in order to extract the country-specific effect driving economic conservatism:
Pref Redi = αWi + δt + γj
where Wi is a vector of demographic characteristics, such as age and gender
45, as well as
measures such as income and education that are meant to capture how much the individual
stands to gain or lose from greater public spending. It also includes a variable that control
for individual trust in politicians, which is likely to influence respondents’ beliefs about the
role of government in the provision of public services. δt is a fixed effect for the date at which
the survey was administered, which captures the possible effect of the international, macro-
economic context on preferences for redistribution. Finally, the dummy variable γj measures the
country effect, i.e the extent to which living in a specific country influences individual economic
conservatism. We choose Switzerland as the reference country in the model and report the list
of coefficient γ for every country in Table 7. All but one country (Japan) surveyed by the ISSP
appear to entertain more liberal views than Switzerland about the role of government in the
provision of jobs and public goods. We store these country-specific scores under the variable
̂PrefCultj to construct a weighted average of foreigners’ attitudes for public spending at the
municipal level. We attribute to every foreign resident from country j the score ̂PrefCultj of
45Because the ISSP questionnaire does not distinguish between native and foreign respondents, we cannot
separate the two and all respondents are therefore included in the sample. We also exclude from the sample
individuals that were younger than 18 at the time of the survey.
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her country of origin, which captures the average citizen’s beliefs that it is the government’s
responsibility to provide jobs and public services. We then compute the weighted average of
foreigners’ relative cultural preferences for public spending CPRi in municipality i following
this simple rule: CPRi =
∑
j
wji
̂PrefCultj , where wji the share of foreigners in municipality i
born in country j is such that
∑
j
wji = 1.
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46Because the list of countries surveyed in the ISSP is not exhaustive, the share of foreign population covered
by our index varies depending on the country of origin of the foreign population across municipalities. Figure
9 graphs the distribution of the municipal share of foreigners for which we were able to impute redistributive
preferences
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Table 7: Relative cultural preferences for public spending
Country Red. score
Japan -0.03
Switzerland 0
USA 0.16
Korea 0.17
Canada 0.22
Australia 0.25
Germany 0.26
New-Zealand 0.27
Sweden 0.29
Netherlands 0.30
Cyprus 0.32
Finland 0.32
Czech Republic 0.34
Denmark 0.35
Belgium 0.38
Taiwan 0.39
UK 0.40
Lithuania 0.41
France 0.41
Iceland 0.42
Hungary 0.47
Norway 0.48
Thailand 0.49
Bulgaria 0.49
Philippines 0.50
Italy 0.53
Turkey 0.53
Dominican Republic 0.55
Slovakia 0.58
Poland 0.60
Uruguay 0.60
Latvia 0.60
Chile 0.60
India 0.61
South Africa 0.62
Israel 0.62
Ireland 0.62
Russia 0.64
Portugal 0.64
Spain 0.66
Slovenia 0.66
Suriname 0.73
Croatia 0.74
Georgia 0.84
Venezuela 0.91
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Note on Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9: The share of welfare beneficiaries is the share of individuals receiving the
Aide Sociale Economique transfer in the resident population. The relative welfare dependency of foreigners
corresponds to the difference between the estimated share of welfare beneficiaries among foreigners and the
share of welfare beneficiaries in the total resident population.
Figure 6: Distribution of the share of welfare beneficiaries
Figure 7: Distribution of foreigners’ relative welfare dependency
Notes: A positive value on the x-axis means that the
share of welfare beneficaries is higher among foreigners
than among natives.
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Figure 8: Distribution of foreigners’ average cultural preferences for redistribution
Figure 9: Share of foreigners covered by index of red. preferences
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